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CONTENTS

Odo Casel's Theory About Liturgy.....	<i>Edward Gratsch</i>	73
Where East Meets West.....	<i>Alfredo G. Parpan, S.J.</i>	83
Mary, Mother of the Priest.....	<i>William J. O'Rourke, S.J.</i>	87
God and the World of Matter.....	<i>Peter Riga</i>	98
The Moral Virtues in St. Thomas: I		
	<i>Edward J. McNally, S.J.</i>	102
California's First Archbishop: A Visit to Vich		
	<i>John Bernard McGloin, S.J.</i>	112
Doctor of Reunion.....	<i>Damian Wheelock, O.F.M.Cap.</i>	117
Newman and the Theory of Doctrinal Development		
	<i>Lawrence F. Barmann, S.J.</i>	121

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

Francis J. Connell, C.S.S.R., and John P. McCormick, S.S.

Enforced Therapy.....	130
Moral Problems of Spying.....	132

(Contents Continued on Next Page)

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(Contents continued from previous page)

Threats As a Means of National Protection 134

Blessings in English 135

Unico Signo Crucis 135

BOOK REVIEWS

Psychiatry and Religious Experience, by *Louis Linn, M.D.*
and *Leo W. Schwartz* 138

Psychopathic Personality and Neurosis, by *A. A. A.*
Terruwe, M.D. 138

Mediatress of All Graces, by *Michael O'Carroll, C.S.SP.* 140

Eucharistic Reflections, by *William Reyna* 142

BOOKS RECEIVED 143

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by JOHN C. FORD, S.J.

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ODO CASEL'S THEORY ABOUT LITURGY

Dom Odo Casel, a Benedictine of German origin, was born at Koblenz-Lützel on September 27, 1886. He studied the humanities at Koblenz, Malmédy and Andernach. Having begun the study of classical philology at the University of Bonn, he interrupted his studies to enter the abbey of Maria Laach on September 8, 1905. After he had obtained his doctorate in theology in Rome, he returned to Bonn where he continued his studies in philology, philosophy, the history of religions, the writings of the Christian Fathers, and the history of the ancient liturgies. In 1922, he became the confessor of the Benedictine nuns at Herstelle where he remained until his death on March 28, 1948.¹

Dom Casel published at least seven books and more than a hundred articles. Jointly with A. Baumstark and R. Guardini, he edited the *Jahrbuch für Liturgiewissenschaft*, which served as one of the principal organs for the propagation of his views. He was involved in at least two controversies. One controversy concerned the relationship of ancient pagan religious rites to Christian worship. In his book, *Die Liturgie als Mysterienfeier*,² he spoke of the ancient Hellenistic cults as the "preparatory school of Christianity," while he regarded the liturgy of the Church as their ideal fulfillment. Casel, in company with a phalanx of disciples, also defended the doctrine of the *Mysteriengegenwart* against an equally numerous host of opponents.³

THE THEORY OF CASEL

The word, "*Mysteriengegenwart*," is one of those inimitable compound German words meaning literally "presence in mystery." Casel explains what he means by the term, "mystery":

The meaning of the divine mystery is threefold and yet simple. Mystery is *first* of all God in Himself, God as the infinitely distant One,

¹ E. Dekkers, O.S.B., "Dom Odo Casel, O.S.B.," in *Ephemerides Liturgicae*, 62 (1948) 371-373.

² *Die Liturgie als Mysterienfeier* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1922), p. 160.

³ Dom Casel objected to calling his teaching about the *Mysteriengegenwart* a "theory." He believed his teaching to be that of the Church. Yet the con-

the Holy and Unapproachable. . . . [Secondly] Christ is the personal mystery because He renders the invisible divinity visible in the flesh. The actions of His lowliness, above all, His sacrificial death on the cross, are mysteries because God reveals Himself in them in a way that exceeds all human methods of measurement. His resurrection and exaltation are mysteries because divine majesty is revealed in the Man Jesus, indeed in a form which is hidden to the world and is known only to believers. . . . Mystery has yet a *third* meaning, closely allied to the other two, which likewise are really but one. Since Christ is no longer visible among us, "the visible things of the Lord have passed into the mysteries," as Leo the Great says.⁴ His person, His salutary works, His effecting of grace we find in the mysteries of worship.⁵

Elsewhere Casel explains in other words the meaning of the term, "mystery," taken in this third sense:

The mystery is a sacred action of worship in which a salutary act [of Christ] becomes present under the rite. While the worshipping community accomplishes this rite, it shares in the salutary act and acquires for itself salvation.⁶

This article will center its attention on the idea expressed by the word, "mystery," taken in Casel's third sense; so that the word, *Mysteriengegenwart*, as understood in this article, might be freely translated as: "The presence in the liturgy of those actions of Christ by which He effected our salvation."

It is the theory of Odo Casel that in the liturgy the very passion and death of Christ, together with the acts of our Lord's life which prepared for it and consummated it, are made present. These redemptive acts of His life are not merely commemorated in the liturgy as they are commemorated, for example, by the passion

siderable opposition to his doctrine seems to warrant the use of the word, theory.

⁴ *Sermo* 74, 2: PL 54, 398A.

⁵ *Das christliche Kult-Mysterium* (Regensburg: Pustet, 1932), pp. 17-19. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from Casel's works are translations from the original German by the author of this article.

⁶ *Bonner Zeitschrift für Theologie und Seelsorge* (abbreviated in this article: *BZThS*), 4(1927) 104. Quoted by J. B. Umberg, "Die These von der Mysteriengegenwart," in *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie* (abbreviated in this article: *ZKT*), 52(1928) 358.

play of Oberammergau;⁷ these acts are not merely virtually present in the sense that the grace merited by these acts is communicated to men through the liturgy; rather the *redemptive actions* of Christ's life are *really* present in the liturgy, just as the Body of Christ is really present in the Eucharist.⁸ In the liturgy Christ is not "born again"; He does not "die again" as He once did in history⁹; on the contrary, the essence of the *original action* of Christ's life is made present in a real manner.

Casel explains that just as the Body and Blood of Christ can be made present at different times and places through the Mass, so too the numerically same redemptive actions of Christ can be made really present at different times and places through the celebration of the liturgy.¹⁰ It is true that once these actions took place in time; but because they are the actions of a God-Man, they enjoy certain supra-temporal prerogatives: they are not bound to a certain time and place as are the actions of a pure creature.

The answers to two questions will serve to clarify Casel's position further. What are the acts of Christ's life that are rendered present in the liturgy? Casel replies that the passion and death of Christ, taken in a very comprehensive sense, are made present:

The passion is taken here as the work of redemption, thus embracing, besides suffering, also the resurrection and ascension and the sitting at the right hand of the Father. For the redemption was perfected only through the elevation of the human flesh to God; the sacrifice of Christ was brought to fulfillment only when it was accepted through the resurrection. Christ is, according to the letter to the Hebrews, a priest forever only in His heavenly exaltation. . . . Many liturgies and several Fathers also add the Incarnation as the preparation for the sacrifice of the cross. Likewise the second coming is at times named as the object of the "remembrances," inasmuch as the whole body of Christ is fully redeemed through it. The Mass is consequently the presence of the *opus redemptionis*.¹¹

Consequently, according to Casel, in the liturgy the passion and death of Christ, together with the events of our Lord's life which prepared for it and consummated it, are made present.

⁷ Odo Casel, "Mysteriengegenwart," in *Jahrbuch für Liturgiewissenschaft* (abbreviated in this article: *JLW*), 8(1928) 159; also 13(1933) 170.

⁸ *JLW*, 8(1928) 185.

⁹ *JLW*, 13(1933) 169.

¹⁰ *JLW*, 8(1928) 191; also p. 195.

¹¹ *BZThS*, loc. cit., p. 107. Quoted by Umberg, *ZKT*, loc. cit., p. 361.

What are the parts of the liturgy in which the passion and death of Christ taken in Casel's comprehensive sense are made present? The passion and death of Christ are present principally in the Mass; but he adds:

All the other Sacraments are derived from the passion of Christ; so that they have quite a close relationship to the passion-mystery [the Mass]; therefore, they take a subordinate position in relation to the Mass and share to some degree in its mystery character—in the highest degree, Baptism (along with Confirmation), which is a dying and rising with Christ—in a corresponding degree, the other Sacraments and also the higher sacramentals—finally, all the rites and prayers of the Church which ultimately find their origin and climax in the Lord's work of redemption.¹²

In other words, according to Casel, in *all* those actions which may be classified under the term, "liturgy," the events of our Lord's life—His redemptive acts—are *rendered present* in a real way.

THE PROOF OFFERED BY CASEL

First of all, Casel offers many quotations from Sacred Scripture in support of his contention that the redemptive acts of Christ's life are really present in the liturgy. Typical of his method of argumentation is the passage quoted below. Casel begins by quoting St. Paul's teaching with reference to what we must do to be saved:

Paul speaks . . . of a "dying with Christ,"¹³ of "being buried with Him," of a "crucifixion"¹⁴ of the old man, whereby the "body of sin is annihilated." The glorified Master however "dies no more; death has no more power over Him."¹⁵ How is the sinful man to die with Him, to be crucified with Him? Perhaps merely in virtue of a grace stemming from Him? That would not be a dying [with Christ]. Or perhaps merely morally? But Paul speaks of the fact that Christians must morally crucify themselves continually, and yet he speaks of them as already "dead to sin."¹⁶ Thus he must be referring to a different dying with Christ, an essential one which is the foundation for that moral death without which it would never be possible. Paul calls

¹² *BZThS*, loc. cit., p. 108. Quoted by Umberg, *ZKT*, loc. cit., p. 360.

¹³ *Phil.* 3:10.

¹⁴ *Gal.* 2:19-20.

¹⁵ *Rom.* 6:9.

¹⁶ *Rom.* 6:11.

it "a being united with Him in the likeness of His death,"¹⁷ a "being buried with Him through Baptism into His death."¹⁸ Thus Baptism renders it possible to share in the death of Christ, although the glorified Christ dies no more. But if a man is to die *physically* with Christ, Christ must die *physically*. But how can He die Who lives forever?

Here we stand on the threshold of the mystery! One cannot evade the words of St. Paul; one cannot understand them of a moral dying with Christ or an application of the effects of the death of Christ. No one can die with another, if that other one does not actually die. But because the historical death of Christ is past, there can be question only of a mystical death that is none the less real. Because Christ must *really* die to sin, therefore the death of Christ must also be *real*. On the other hand there can be no new death of Christ for Christ died "once for all"; thus only the historical death can be made present in order that the individual sinner can be baptized into this death and thus arrive at life in God. But how is this to come about? The wisdom of God found the sacramental way. The "likeness of death" of which Paul speaks is a holy rite which *contains* the death of Christ and at the same time makes it possible to live with Him, that is, according to the terminology devised beforehand by the ancients and realized in the Church: a mystery.¹⁹

Secondly, Casel assembles a great number of quotations from the Fathers in support of the doctrine of the *Mysteriengegenwart*. One of these quotations from St. Leo the Great has already been mentioned:

Since Christ is no longer visible among us, "the visible things of the Lord have passed into the mysteries," as Leo the Great says.²⁰ His person, His salutary works, His effecting of grace we find in the mysteries of worship.²¹

Another Father cited is St. Cyprian who has written:

We make mention of His passion in all sacrifices; for the passion of the Lord is the sacrifice which we offer.²²

Casel's comment is this:

¹⁷ Rom. 6:5.

¹⁸ Rom. 6:3.

¹⁹ *JLW* 8(1928) 157-158.

²⁰ *Sermo*, 74, 2: *PL* 54, 398A.

²¹ *Das christliche Kult-Mysterium*, p. 19.

²² *Epist.* 63, 17.

These words teach quite clearly that the sacrifice consists in the remembrance of the passion, and that this remembrance is the *passion itself* (under the image of the rite). On the one side stands thus the unique death of the Lord, His self-sacrifice; on the other side stands the *commemoration*, the *sacrament* of the same event; that is, a ritual action which conceals within itself, in mysterious fashion, the reality of the historical deed: thus, a mystery.²³

Casel sees a classic testimony to his theory in these words of St. Gregory the Great:

For this sacrifice [of the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ] doth especially save our souls from everlasting damnation, which in mystery doth renew unto us the death of the Son of God: Who although being risen from death, doth not now die any more, nor death shall not any further prevail against Him: yet living in Himself immortally, and without all corruption, He is again sacrificed for us in this mystery of the holy oblation: for there His Body is received, there His flesh is distributed for the salvation of the people: there His Blood is not now shed betwixt the hands of the infidels, but poured into the mouths of the faithful.²⁴

Thirdly, relying on the authority of St. Thomas, Casel argues in support of his theory thus:

Every Sacrament according to the teaching of St. Thomas effects what it signifies.²⁵ . . . But if the Eucharist as a sacrifice is the Sacrament of the passion, as the whole of Tradition teaches, so must the symbolic representation of the suffering through the separated species . . . contain that suffering, sacramentally-really; for the Sacraments effect that which they signify.²⁶

²³ *BZThS*, loc. cit., p. 137. Quoted by Umberg, *ZKT*, loc. cit., p. 377.

²⁴ *Dialog.* 4, 58 (translated by P. W., Medici Society, Ltd., London: Cited in *JLW*, 6[1926] 174).

²⁵ *JLW*, 6(1926) 196.

²⁶ *BZThS*, loc. cit., p. 117, note. Quoted by Umberg, *ZKT*, loc. cit., p. 387. A merit of Casel's theory is that it seems to solve very well the so-called *crux theologorum*; namely, the question: How is the idea of sacrifice verified in the consecration of the Mass, where it is to be placed according to the teaching of Pope Pius XII (*Mediator Dei*: *AAS* 39(1947) 563, 548s)? It is a teaching of faith that our Divine Savior Himself is the Victim offered to God in the sacrifice of the Mass. A victim implies immolation and death. How is our Lord, Who dies no more, immolated in the Mass? The Victim is immolated in the Mass, Casel would say, in the sense that the very im-

OBJECTIONS TO CASEL'S THEORY

In our opinion, the theory of Dom Casel is highly improbable for two reasons at least. The basic theory of Casel is that the numerically same redemptive actions of Christ's life are present in the liturgy *really* and not merely virtually or symbolically. The first objection to this theory is that it apparently cannot be reconciled with the teaching of the Council of Trent. Comparing and contrasting the sacrifice of Christ on the cross and in the Mass, the Council teaches:

The victim is one and the same, the same One offering now by the ministry of priests Who offered Himself then on the cross, only the manner of offering being different.²⁷

In the same place the Council explains in what sense the manner of offering is different:

In this sacrifice which is accomplished in the Mass, that same Christ is contained and immolated in an *unbloody* manner Who offered Himself once in a bloody manner on the altar of the cross.²⁸

From the words of the Council it follows what the immolation of the Mass is not the numerically same bloody one of Calvary, but an unbloody one. The position of the Council is in direct opposition to that of Casel who maintains that the *bloody* immolation pertains to the substance of Christ's sacrificial death on Calvary and is therefore present in the Mass.²⁹

Casel has considered this objection to his theory. He believes that it is not a valid one. He states that the unbloody immolation of the Mass of which the Council speaks simply excludes the historically-real repetition of the sacrifice of the cross which is impossible. The words of the Council teach, according to Casel, that the substance of the bloody sacrifice of Calvary is present in

molation of the Victim that took place on Calvary is made present each time that the words of consecration are uttered.

²⁷ DB 940.

²⁸ DB 940.

²⁹ *JLW*, 8(1928) 220. Pope Pius XII also seems to teach that the bloody immolation pertains to the substance of Christ's sacrificial death on the cross; for he says that "the immolation of the victim [on the cross] was brought about by a bloody death" (*Mediator Dei*; *AAS*, 39[1947] 548).

a pneumatic, sacramental form. The *unbloody* immolation, in Casel's view, signifies the pneumatic or spiritual mode of being of the sacrifice of the cross in the Mass as opposed to its real, historical bloody character on Calvary.³⁰

It does not seem that Casel's interpretation of the words of the Council is correct. Could the Council have said without qualification that Christ is immolated in an unbloody manner in the Mass if the substance of His bloody immolation on Calvary were also present, albeit in a pneumatic, sacramental, spiritual, "mysterious" way?

A second objection to the theory of Casel is, in the opinion of many, that the theory seems to lack a solid foundation. All the quotations, for example, which have been advanced by Casel in support of his theory and cited above are reasonably interpreted in senses which do not support Casel's view. An illustration of this last statement follows.

Casel's first argument in support of his theory is drawn from various passages in St. Paul's letters. "Christians," Casel would maintain, "must die with Christ, be buried with Him. But how can Christians do this unless they be associated with the very death and burial of Christ made present in the liturgy of Baptism, as St. Paul teaches in the sixth chapter of Romans?"

In answer to Casel's argument it must be observed that another interpretation of these passages is given by many exegetes. It is this: St. Paul is demonstrating the existence and nature of our union with Christ from the two baptismal ceremonies of immersion and emersion. The immersion represents the Christian's death and burial with Christ; the emersion, his resurrection with Christ. When in Baptism the catechumen is *immersed* beneath the water, he is thereby, as it were, buried with Christ, sharing His being dead to sin; and when the Christian *emerges* from beneath the water, he thereby rises, as it were, with Christ from the tomb, sharing the new life of the Risen Lord.³¹

This interpretation does not suppose the presence of the very passion, death and resurrection of Christ in the sense of Casel in

³⁰ *JLW*, 8(1928) 220.

³¹ Cf., e.g., A. Theissen, *The Epistle to the Romans in A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture* (London: Nelson and Sons, 1952), p. 1058.

the rite of Baptism; further, it seems to be in perfect harmony with the text of St. Paul; and until it is definitely excluded, Casel may not justly cite the text of St. Paul in support of his theory.

Casel believes that the words of St. Leo—"The visible things of the Lord have passed into the mysteries"—support his theory. In the context in which these words appear, however, Pope Leo is speaking of the ascension of Christ. Remarking that Our Lord now sits at the right hand of the Father, the Pope seems to say that even after His ascension, *Our Lord* remains with us in some way in the Sacraments. The words of Leo therefore seem to refer to Our Lord's continuing presence on earth, but not necessarily to the real presence of His own *redeeming actions*.

Again Casel believes that the words of St. Cyprian—"We make mention of His passion in all sacrifices; for the passion of the Lord is the sacrifice which we offer"—support his thesis. Apparently these words could be interpreted in favor of Casel's theory. Yet, seemingly, they also admit another interpretation. It is this: Cyprian uses the word, "passion" (in the sentence, "The passion of the Lord is the sacrifice which we offer") to designate that which signifies the passion of the Lord—a usage about which another great African, St. Augustine (and after him, St. Thomas) has this to say: "The images of things are wont to be called by the names of those things which they represent."³² Until this latter interpretation of Cyprian's statement is excluded, Casel's theory may claim no support from them.

Likewise, the words of St. Gregory the Great cited by Casel indicate that during the Mass a sacrifice is offered. But it does not follow necessarily from the words of St. Gregory that this sacrifice is the numerically same one offered on Calvary.

It must be noted here that even if Dom Casel's view is supported by statements of a few Fathers (they are unknown to us), such statements would have to be rejected as erroneous if they contradicted the Church's teaching formulated, let us say, by the Council of Trent.

Finally, Casel argues that, if the Eucharist signifies the passion of Christ, it must necessarily effect and contain it, for the Sacraments effect that which they signify, as St. Thomas teaches. How-

³² III, q. 83, a.1.

ever, it must be observed in reply to Casel that the axiom—"The Sacraments effect what they signify"—does not have the universal application which Casel ascribes to it. For example, the Sacrament of Matrimony signifies the union of Christ and His Church,³³ but certainly the Sacrament does not effect this union.³⁴ So too from the fact that the Eucharist signifies the passion of Christ, it does not follow necessarily that the numerically same passion of Calvary is effected by, and contained in, the Eucharist really.

It is for these reasons that we regard as highly improbable the theory of Dom Casel—the doctrine of the *Mysteriengegenwart*, as it has been proposed, that is, and defended by him.

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³³ *Eph.* 5, 32.

³⁴ *Suppl.*, q. 42, a.1., ad 4.

WHERE EAST MEETS WEST

Since the first chapters of Genesis were written, it is much too obvious that the planet Earth has undergone a series of face-liftings; the handiwork of man, both martial and pacific, has changed her face in countless spots. One certainly would be more than naïve to expect the Jerusalem of the year 1960, tensely divided between Arab and Jew, to be a replica of the city captured by General Allenby in 1917 and, much less, the Herodian city in the time of Christ. That, according to archeologists, lies under at least sixty-five feet of rubble.

But for all this, Father Prat's observation remains a verity. "Nothing is more disconcerting," he wrote, "to the pilgrim who has not been forewarned, than to find the site of the Basilica which encloses both Calvary and the Holy Sepulchre in a depression of ground almost in the center of the city." The experience is understandable. After all, the Gospels are quite explicit in narrating that Christ was led out to die on Calvary or Golgotha, the Place of the Skull, and this site, St. John noted, "was near the city" (*John* 19:20), and not within the city. Poets and artists moreover have always represented Calvary as some sort of a hill or even a mountain!

But even if he were forewarned, he would still be disconcerted and by other more poignant facts, perhaps. That a Muslim should have custody since the time of the Crusades over the one and only door of this Christian shrine strikes him as quite anomalous, however centuries-old the tradition may be. He comes to see also a vastly perturbing truth that cannot be denied: by whatever aesthetic standards it may be reckoned, this most venerable shrine in all Christendom ranks easily as the shabbiest, despite the gleaming gold and silver in its chapels. To him comes the realization at once saddening, maddening and sobering, that this holiest of all Christian shrines, paradoxically, is also the most disputed, fought and wrangled over.

A visit to the Basilica of the Holy Sepulchre brings one face to face moreover with certain facets of Christianity he has only encountered in more or less accurate "historical" novels, glorified Hollywood "religious" pictures and—if he is of the more literate

type—occasional erudite articles on what have been relegated to footnotes in textbooks of history. It is here in this shabbiest and yet most glorious of Christian shrines that one is brought to grips with the inescapable past of heresies and schisms that have perdured to the present. For the very first time, perhaps, he is made very much aware of the problem of reunion between Eastern and Western Christianity that confronts the Holy See.

He comes to realize, almost with a shock, that Roman Catholicism and Protestantism with its multi-splintered sects are but the occidental features of this world religion called Christianity. For the very first time, it may dawn upon him, too, that there are others besides the Orthodox who represent Oriental Christianity. Here in this mystifying collection of chapels and dimly-lit passageways where Latins, Greeks, Armenians, Copts, and Syrians (not to mention the Ethiopians) jealously guard their privileged positions no less militantly than the tough border patrols of the Israelis and the Arab Legionnaires of King Hussein do over the demarcation line, the problem of reunion is indeed concretized. It becomes as much a reality as the marble casing over what remains of the Tomb of Christ after centuries of battle and burning, pillage and plunder by both Christian and Muslim alike.

A never failing source of revenue for the Ottomans, the Basilica is tax-free under the Hashemites. The Roman Catholic Church, the Greek Orthodox Church, and the Armenian Church are recognized by the Jordan Government as the legal owners or, in the language of Father Ignatius Mancini of the Franciscan Hospice of the Casa Nova, the "comproprietors" of the Basilica. The Syrians and Copts, of course, hold on to their limited rights. The Ethiopians, less fortunate, have no rights whatever in the Basilica, but they are still where H. V. Morton found them, way back in the thirties, on the roof of St. Helena's Chapel.

This phenomenon of a divided ownership has naturally resulted in some unpleasantness not only for the various groups concerned but for the shrine itself. The head of the Latin community in the Basilica is Father Joseph Uzal, O.F.M.; the Greeks have Father Kiriakos Spiridonides and the Armenians, Father Leo Apelian. The Latins maintain the most cordial of relations with their "comproprietors" but despite the numerous meetings held with the Greeks and Armenians, no repair work has been done up to now and this for the simple reason H. V. Morton pointed out some three

decades ago that "the rehangings of a picture, the repair of a stone, and even the mending of a window, assume such gigantic importance in the eyes of the communities that they provoke a situation capable of indefinite postponement." Extensive repair work has been done on the Muslim mosque of the Dome of the Rock, all but ruined during the Jerusalem fighting in 1948. In the Basilica the gilded trappings of piety only serve to accentuate the air of shabby decay.

Every inch of holy space is marked out by centuries-old tradition among the Latins, Greeks, Armenians, Syrians, and Copts. But there are certain areas that are common property. These are, by felicitous agreement, the major chapel of this shrine—the Chapel of the Holy Sepulchre—where the Latins celebrate the Mass of Easter Day all the year round; the Stone of the Anointing—an oblong slab of red marble; and the Chapel of the Reproaches which one passes on the way to the Armenian Chapel of St. Helena.

The Latins have the portions reserved for the monastery of the Franciscans, the Catholic guardians of the Holy Places since the days of the Crusades, and their choir. They have also the Altar of Magdalene, the Chapel of the Franks, the rock-cistern where the cross was found, and a part of Calvary where they have the Chapel of the Nailing to the Cross and an altar to the Sorrowful Mother. The Greeks have their corresponding choir and the residence of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, the so-called Prison of Christ, the Chapel of St. Longinus, and a portion likewise of Calvary where they have the Chapel of the Raising of the Cross. The Syrians have a darkened chapel entered by a low stone door; the Copts have a very tiny chapel attached to the end of the Tomb itself. The Armenians have their Stone of the Holy Women, the Chapel of the Division of the Garments and the Chapel of St. Helena.

One soon comes to realize that for all the external diversity of ritual trappings, both East and West meet in essentially identical piety in this historic labyrinth of passageways and chapels heavy with the smell of incense. The voices vary: Latin and Greek, Armenian and Coptic, Syrian and Arabic. But all are raised in prayer above the gilded altars blazing with candlelight to the same One and Triune God, professing faith confirmed by centuries of persecution and bloodbaths in Him who being made Man, suffered as a man, was crucified here on Calvary, died and was buried, and

then rose again from the dead from this very sepulchre now enclosed by this very tiny marble chapel.

Indeed the Basilica of the Holy Sepulchre is a witness to the historical fact of Christianity. But it is also a sad commentary on its long perduring state of disunity.

By a dim flight of some twenty steps one goes up to Calvary. No place in the Basilica could be more symbolic of the split between East and West than the two pillars that separate the Greek Chapel of the Raising of the Cross from the Latin Chapel of the Nailing to the Cross. But nothing could be more symbolic likewise of the hope of reunion between East and West than the altar of Our Lady of Sorrows placed so significantly between these two chapels of the riven Church of Christ.

ALFREDO G. PARPAN, S.J.

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MARY, MOTHER OF THE PRIEST

Devotion to Mary as his Mother is a characteristic of the piety of almost every American priest.¹ So universal is this devotion to Mary as Mother of priests, that it seems almost instinctive. Nevertheless it is based upon a rather profound insight not only into the origin and nature of the priesthood but into the theology of the Incarnation and the divine maternity.

The purpose of this brief essay is to investigate Mary's part in the origins of the Catholic priesthood. But since the Catholic priest is not a priest in his own right, but only because the Holy Spirit has summoned him to participate in the priesthood of Christ, it is necessary first to investigate the origins of Christ's priesthood and Mary's role in its beginnings. Thus we propose to treat, first of all, the nature and origins of Christ's priesthood; then the problem of Mary's relationship to her Son's priesthood; thirdly, review the Catholic priesthood; and finally draw some conclusions as to Mary's relationship to the Catholic priesthood.

THE ORIGINS OF CHRIST'S PRIESTHOOD

Cardinal Suhard in his memorable pastoral, *Priests Among Men*, bases his entire instruction on the fact that the priesthood of Christ had its beginning at the moment of the Incarnation.² The Cardinal is here only repeating the traditional teaching of the Church and the common doctrine of theologians; and this doctrine that the Son of God became Priest at the moment of the Incarnation is a belief solidly based on Sacred Scriptures.

St. Augustine is one of the principal witnesses to this connection between the Incarnation and the priesthood of Christ:

In as much as He is born of the Father, God is God. He is not a priest. He is priest because of the flesh which He has assumed, because of the Victim He received from us to offer.³

¹ I would like to take this opportunity of dedicating this article to a fellow priest, my old and revered pastor, Msgr. John J. Loughlin, who celebrated his golden jubilee this year.

² Cardinal Suhard, *The Church Today: Priests Among Men* (Chicago: Fides, 1953), pp. 225 ff.

³ Quoted by Suhard, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

It must be noticed that the human nature is essential to the priesthood of Christ. For the Divine Word becomes priest only when He becomes Incarnate. The Son of God is formally a priest only in His human nature which is united to the divinity by virtue of the Hypostatic Union. In fact, the human nature of Jesus Christ possesses its priesthood only because it is united to the Second Person of the Trinity. Thus it is the *hypostatic union* which gives the priesthood of Christ not only its power and dignity, but its very existence. As Mersch puts it very well:

He is priest independently of all ulterior designation, in virtue of His very composition (if we may dare so to put it) and of His structure. His consecration is nothing other than His Personality, and His anointing; it is He: He is the anointed, He is the Christ of the Lord, because He is the Man-God.

The Man-God, that is the whole thing; what He is, is the *resume* of all He does. . . . What else is He but the priesthood itself, the priesthood perfectly and divinely realized.⁴

At the very moment then that the Son of God assumes flesh in the womb of the Virgin Mary, He is ordained priest. The Word was not priest before being made flesh. Rather, it was only at the moment of the Incarnation, neither before nor after, that He became priest.

The connection between the priesthood of Christ and His Incarnation is, however, more than temporal. The assumption of a human nature by the Son is *necessary* if He is to be our priest.

The *Epistle to the Hebrews* gives witness to one facet of this urgency:

The Son who sanctifies and the sons who are sanctified have a common origin, all of them; . . . and since these children have a common inheritance of flesh and blood, He too shared that inheritance with them. . . . After all He does not make Himself the angels' champion, no sign of that; it is the sons of Abraham that He champions. And so He must needs become altogether like His brethren; He would be a high priest who could feel for us and be our true representative before God, to make atonement for the sins of the people.⁵

⁴ Mersch, *Morality and the Mystical Body* (New York: Kenedy, 1939), p. 140.

⁵ *Hebrews* 2:11-17.

Thus the author of the Hebrews makes clear his belief that Christ had to share in our human nature in order to be our priest. Furthermore, if He is to be our perfect priest, He must suffer.⁶

Of course, the necessity of which we speak is hypothetical. But from the moment that God decreed that man is to be redeemed by a priestly act on the part of His Son, it becomes necessary for the Son to become our brother. Thus, the Savior and the saved must have the same origin and share the same nature. If the Son, as a priest, is to save mankind, He must be a man. And so it is that the Incarnation becomes necessary.⁷

Moreover, as we are well aware, the priesthood is a vocation. ". . . nobody can take on himself such a privilege as this."⁸ The priest, although he represents them, is not elected by the people. He is chosen and called by God. When the author of Hebrews describes the vocation of Christ to the priesthood, he again points up the relationship of the Incarnation to the priesthood of the Incarnate Word:

So it is with Christ. He did not raise Himself to the dignity of the high priesthood; it was God that raised Him to it when He said, "Thou art my Son, I have begotten Thee this day"; and so, elsewhere, "Thou art a priest forever, in the line of Melchisedech."⁹

Prat's comment on these verses is very much to the point, emphasizing once again the importance of Christ's humanity:

Although the Son is *Son* from all eternity, these words are, according to the Psalmist, spoken only at the moment when He assumes a human nature. *In becoming man*, He is *ipso facto* consecrated priest, that is to say, an accredited mediator of the human race with God. His Father confirms this dignity to Him with an oath: "The Lord has sworn and He will not repent: Thou art a priest forever in the line of Melchisedech."¹⁰

It is His human nature that is anointed priest, and it is through His human nature that the Son must exercise His priesthood.

⁶ Hebrews 2:18.

⁷ Cf. Prat, *The Theology of St. Paul* (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1950) I, 376.

⁸ Hebrews 5:4.

⁹ Hebrews 5:5-6.

¹⁰ Prat, *op. cit.*, p. 377.

Consequently, He could not receive His vocation to the priesthood until He had taken possession of a human nature. Immediately upon His Incarnation, the Father calls His Son to the priesthood. And His human nature is anointed with the power of the priesthood in virtue of the hypostatic union.

And what of the response the Son makes to His Father's call? When does He accept this vocation, and what is the nature of His acceptance?

As Christ comes into the world He says, "No sacrifice, no offering was Thy demand; Thou has endowed Me instead with a body. Thou hast not found any pleasure in burnt-sacrifices, sacrifices for sin. See then," I said, "I am coming to fulfill what is written of Me, where the book lies unrolled: To do Thy will, O my God!"¹¹

The Word then, immediately upon assuming human flesh, begins His life upon earth with a priestly action, that of *oblation*. The Word does not consecrate Himself to sacerdotal activity before His Incarnation. Neither does He delay this consecration to the Last Supper or Calvary. But at the Incarnation, at the very moment when He clothes Himself with the flesh and blood which makes Him a Victim, precisely then does the Incarnate Word receive and accept His vocation to the priesthood. A priest must be a priest before he offers a sacrifice, since he has the power of offering sacrifice only because he is already priest. The sacrifice that Christ will offer will be the sacrifice of His life. But He is a priest and He accepts His priesthood and makes a priestly oblation of His life at the first moment of His mortal life.¹²

St. Thomas finds the humanity of Christ an essential element of His priesthood in the fact that He is the mediator between God and men. Essential to the priesthood is the office of mediator, and it is precisely to exercise this office of mediator that the Son must take possession of a human nature.¹³

In the third part of the *Summa Theologica*, St. Thomas raises the question, whether Christ, *as man*, is the mediator between God and men. In support of an affirmative answer to this question, the Angelic Doctor writes:

¹¹ *Hebrews* 10:5-7.

¹² Cf. Prat, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

¹³ Cf. *Hebrews* 5:1-3.

It belongs to Him as man, to unite men to God by communicating to men both precepts and gifts, and by offering satisfaction and prayers to God for men. And therefore, He is most truly called mediator as man.¹⁴

And in his reply to objections to this position St. Thomas further states:

... yet it belongs to Him as man, to satisfy for the sins of the human race. And in this sense He is called the mediator of God and men.¹⁵

Hence it is that in terms of our redemption, or the priestly activity of Christ, when we speak of the Incarnation, the emphasis should be laid upon the reality that there is a man among us who is God. The "good news" of Christianity rests upon the proclamation that God has become man, rather than the statement that the humanity of Christ has been assumed by a Divine Person.¹⁶ Christ is thus our priest, mediator and savior, not because He is God, but because He is the God-Man.

St. Paul sums this up in his letter to Timothy:

There is only one God, and only one mediator between God and men, Jesus Christ, who is a man, like them, and gave Himself up as a ransom for them all.¹⁷

MARY'S PART IN THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST

Human nature is essential to the priesthood of Christ. To express this necessity in technical terms, and perhaps thereby describe it more precisely: His humanity is the material cause of Christ's priesthood, and Christ is priest formally in His human nature. For it is the human nature of Christ which is anointed by the hypostatic union and becomes priest. Further, it is through the human nature that the Divine Personality of the Son effects our redemption and offers the sacrifice of our salvation. It is the instrument used by the Word to bring about our salvation.

But whence did Christ derive His human nature? The answer, of course, is obvious. The Son of God received His human nature

¹⁴ III, q.26, a.2.

¹⁵ III, q.26, a.2, ad 3.

¹⁶ Cf. Karl Adam, *The Christ of Faith* (New York: Pantheon Press, 1957), pp. 296-301.

¹⁷ I Timothy 2:5.

from His mother, the Virgin Mary. If there is any doctrine which the Church has treasured and guarded from the days of the Apostles to the present it is this: The Blessed Virgin Mary is the Mother of God. Her divine maternity is mentioned in the earliest Symbols of the Faith;¹⁸ St. Cyril defended her motherhood and its privileges in the famous letter against Nestorius and quoted at the Council of Ephesus;¹⁹ the Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon²⁰ and Constantinople²¹ reiterated Mary's unique relationship to her Son in their great Christological pronouncements. The statement of the Second Council of Constantinople is, perhaps, worth repeating:

If anyone says that the glorious ever-Virgin Mary is not the Mother of God in a true sense, but only by a misuse of language; or that she is Mother of God in a transferred sense as though a mere man were born of her and not the Divine Word Incarnate; . . . or if anyone calls her Mother of man or Mother of Christ as if Christ were not God, and does not admit that in the proper sense and in all truth she is the Mother of God because the Divine Word, who was born of the Father before time, took flesh of her in this last age, and that the holy Council of Chalcedon also confessed her to be Mother of God in this holy sense: let such a one be anathema.²²

Mary is, therefore, the mother of a Divine Person according to His human nature and birth in time. She is not the mother of a man who later became God; rather, she is mother of One, Who, in the very moment of His conception, is already God.

This Divine Person of the Son is given by God to Mary as her Son, that through her He might be clothed in a human nature. Looked at in this way, the object of the maternal activity of Mary is not simply the Word made flesh, but the Word existing from eternity and Who is to be made flesh through Mary.²³

Mary is rightly called the Mother of God because she did for the Divine Person of her Son what every mother does for her child. She provided and prepared the matter necessary for the

¹⁸ Cf. Denz. 2, 13, 16, 20, etc.

¹⁹ Denz. 113, 117, 118.

²⁰ Denz. 148.

²¹ Denz. 218.

²² *The Church Teaches* (St. Louis, Herder, 1957), No. 421.

²³ Cf. Lercher, *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae* II, 281-287.

assumption of a human nature by her Divine Son. Since Mary then provided the humanity for her Son, she made it possible not only for the Word to become man, but through her activity it is now possible for her Divine Son to be priest. Mary has provided the essential element for the exercise of Christ's priesthood; without this human nature which He received from Mary, there would be no priesthood, and therefore, no Calvary, no Mass.

Mary is not the mother of a man who became God; rather, in her most pure womb *God* became Incarnate, assumed a human nature, and thus Mary is truly the Mother of God. Likewise, Mary is not the mother of a man who later became a priest. But her Son, because He is Man-God, is priest from the first moment of His conception. Thus Mary, by virtue of her maternal office, is *Mother of The Priest*. She is the mother of Him who is completely and essentially the priest.

Our Lady played an essential part in the priestly vocation of her Son. For Mary, in performing the function which gives her the indisputable title of Mother of God, provided her Son with the human nature so essential to His priesthood. This is the nature of Mary's intimate relationship to her Son's priesthood: through the function of her maternity, her Divine Son not only assumed a human nature, but He also became The Priest. Thus Mary's relationship to her Son's priesthood is not accidental, but it is a relationship that has its basis in her divine motherhood.

The priesthood of Christ originates in the Temple of Mary's womb at the moment that Mary submits to the will of God: "Be it done unto me according to Thy word."²⁴ The angel has made an offer to Mary and has asked a question to which God expected a reply. Mary's answer was a free and personal decision. God's plan for the salvation of mankind depended upon her reply, and would be carried out only through her free choice.

Now the dignity of motherhood takes its origin from love and the conscious desire for the child arising therefrom. Where the Virgin Mother is to bear the Son of God, there can be no doubt that her consent is freely and lovingly given.²⁵

²⁴ *Luke* 1:38.

²⁵ Cf. Dillersberger, *The Gospel of St. Luke*. (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1958), pp. 56 ff.

But what is it to which Mary consents? Mary knows, of course, that in assenting to the angel's offer she is accepting the role of motherhood for the Son of God. But she further realizes that she is consenting to be the mother of the Savior and Redeemer, and consequently the mother of the Priest. Hence Mary knowingly and willingly gives her consent to be the Mother of the Savior. By reason of this assent she becomes an immediate and moral cause of our redemption and merits the title of co-redemptrix.²⁶

Let us recall the angel's message:

Behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and shalt bear a Son, and shalt call Him Jesus. He shall be great, and men will know Him for the Son of the Most High; the Lord God will give Him the throne of His father David, and He shall reign over the House of Jacob eternally; His kingdom shall never have an end.²⁷

The significance of the name Jesus should not be overlooked. In the Old Testament, God often gave or changed a man's name when he was singled out to perform a great service for God and His chosen people. The name, Jesus, was not given arbitrarily or superficially, but the name itself indicated the function which the person who bore it was to fulfill.

Now the name, Jesus, means: "God is our Savior." And so, when the angel gave her son the name Jesus, Mary knew perfectly well that she was to give birth to the Savior so long awaited by her people. Furthermore, she understood the Sacred Scriptures more profoundly and more truly than any of her contemporaries. Hence, Mary realized that as Savior, her Son must suffer and offer the sacrifice of His life for our salvation. And she knew she must suffer along with Him. It was to this that Mary consented.²⁸

Thus, in reality, Mary gave her Son this name Jesus, and she gave it deliberately, for He could have received this name in the true sense only because He had a human mother: "It was only through a human mother that He could become 'God with us' and 'God our savior.'" ²⁹ Thus it is only because He has a human mother that the Incarnate Word became a Priest and Savior.

²⁶ Cf. J. A. de Aldama, *Sacrae Theologiae Summa* (Madrid: B.A.C., 1953) III, 426-429.

²⁷ *Luke* 1:31-33.

²⁸ Dillersberger, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

²⁹ Cf. Suhard, *op. cit.*, pp. 226 ff.

THE CATHOLIC PRIESTHOOD

Jesus Christ is priest because He is the God-Man. He alone possesses the fulness of the priesthood because He is a priest by the very force of His Personality. The function of the priesthood is effectively to mediate between man and his Creator. This Christ alone can do, since He is a divine Person who is at the same time man and God:

But the Divine Redeemer wished that the priestly life, which He began in His earthly life by His prayers and by His sacrifice, should not cease throughout the centuries in His Mystical Body which is the Church. Therefore, He instituted the visible priesthood to offer in every place a clean oblation. . . . The Church, then, faithful to the mandate of her Founder, continues the priestly office of Jesus Christ, and does this primarily through the Sacred Liturgy.³⁰

The Catholic priesthood is the continuation in time of the priesthood of Christ; it is the extension of Christ the Priest throughout the ages and throughout the world. This, obviously, is not to detract in any way from the priesthood of Christ. Rather, this is made necessary by the exigencies of human nature, which require both a visible sacrifice and a visible priesthood.³¹ The Catholic priest is the ambassador of Christ, he is the human instrument by which "the Divine Redeemer continues the work of redemption in all its world-embracing and divine efficacy. . . ." ³² Thus understood, the priest is rightly called "another Christ."

The priest is not a priest by reason of his nature or personality; he is a priest because he has been chosen by God to represent His Son among men. He is a chosen instrument through which Christ continues to give his Life to mankind. This is the dignity of the priesthood, it comes from Christ and exercises itself in sanctifying others in Christ. Mersch describes the priesthood as: "Jesus Christ always leaning over the world and always contriving that we shall live by Him."³³

The priest is a human being who lends his eyes, his ears, his hands, his head and heart to Christ that through him "men might

³⁰ Pius XII, *Mediator Dei*. (New York: Paulist Press, 1948), paragh. 2-3.

³¹ Cf. Council of Trent Session 22 Chapter 1: Denz. 938.

³² Pius XI, *The Catholic Priesthood* (Washington, D. C., NCWC), p. 9.

³³ Mersch, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

have life and that they might have it in greater abundance."³⁴ The priest has no power of himself, but he brings life and restores life only because he shares in the sacerdotal power of Christ. Christ works in each priest. It is through his human agent, the priest, that Christ forgives sin; it is through the words of Consecration pronounced by the priest, that Christ again makes present among us His Sacrifice; it is by the hands of the priest that Christ again gives life in Baptism; and through the anointing of the priest Christ continues to console the sick and dying. For while the priest performs his duty, it is Christ who acts through the sacraments.³⁵

Consequently, there is only one priest, Christ. The Catholic priesthood is not a multiplication of priests, but the continuation of one Priest, Jesus Christ. To quote Pius XII again: ". . . the visible and external priesthood of Jesus Christ . . . is conferred on chosen men through a spiritual generation in Holy Orders . . . marking the recipients as ministers of sacred things, conformed to Jesus Christ the Priest. . . ." ³⁶

CONCLUSION

The relationship of Mary to the priest today should now be somewhat clearer. The priest derives his power, ultimately, from Christ; he is priest only because he has been chosen to share in the sacerdotal power of the God-Man, Mary's Son. He shares in this priesthood because he has been "chosen" and because the imposition of hands by his bishop has marked his soul indelibly with the sign of Christ the Priest.

But the priesthood in which he shares has its origin in the Incarnation. Mary is truly the mother of priests, because she is the mother of Him in whose priesthood they share. And it was precisely while and because Mary exercised her maternal functions that her Son became The Priest. Thus her connection with the priesthood is not accidental, but intrinsic and real and maternal.

Mary is a formal co-operator, and it was her "*fiat*" which was the occasion of Christ's ordination. It was through Mary's ma-

³⁴ *John* 10:10.

³⁵ Pius XII, *op. cit.*, pargh. 91.

³⁶ Pius XII, *op. cit.*, pargh. 61.

ternal activity that the Son of God was able to assume that human nature essential to His priesthood. Without Mary there would be no priest and no priesthood. To this extent, the very existence of the Catholic priesthood depends upon Mary, the Mother of the Priest.

For this reason, the devotion of the priest to Mary, has a special characteristic which distinguishes it from the devotion of the rest of the faithful. For Mary is, in a special sense, his mother, and just as Mary provided her divine Son with the human nature so necessary to His priesthood, so the priest may confidently expect through her those graces so necessary for the perfect performance of his priestly functions.

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GOD AND THE WORLD OF MATTER

The modern world is filled with the spirit of industrialization and material progress. Work and human activity in general has taken on a new philosophical interpretation over the past 75 years. The lay-movement in the Church has also focused the attention of theologians on the theological signification of man's activity and the transformation of the world in which he works, and—for the Christian—the world by which he is sanctified.

Aside from some very good essays on the subject by such eminent authors as Chenu, Thils, Maritain, Congar and LaCroix, there has been little effort on the part of theologians to give technology, work and progress in general any profound theological interpretation. And yet, such an interpretation is badly needed, not only to answer certain legitimate Marxist difficulties against the hereunto Christian interpretation of human activity in its *ensemble*, but also to give Catholic laymen a religious and Christian sense of their "profane" activities such as medicine, economics, psychology, sociology, work and, in short, all human activity in and on the world as distinguished from the "sacred."

The Biblical interpretation of man's activity in the world as witnessed by a great part of the tradition of the Greek Fathers of the Church (man as the *microcosmos*) will be eminently helpful in our task of interpretation and signification. From the first pages of Genesis, we see that man is called, in a sense, to collaborate with God in the work of Creation. Man is God's lieutenant who is to dominate "the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, the animals and all the earth" precisely because man is created in "the image and likeness of God." Man's image and likeness to God is precisely that, like God, man has a share in the dominion of the earth. And, in a sense, man will continue creation by his further activity over what has initially been given to him by God.

Thus, no activity of man on God's Creation—no matter what his interior intention—can be divorced from this divine activity which is man's. Accordingly, man's activity on creation has a religious and divine sense in itself, an end in itself. Not the supreme end of creation and of man, but at least a "secondary" end which has its signification in the original command of God and in the

God-given destiny of man on earth. This is significant for a theology of the "temporal" or "profane," because human activity on creation is viewed not simply as an instrumental function, as it was during the "sacred-profane" theology of the Middle Ages, but as having a divine value of its own right.

The Biblical picture of man's activity is further developed by the "pneuma-sarks" antithesis of St. Paul. The "spiritual" and "carnal" of the Bible is not the same as some modern preachers would have us believe. It was not the antithesis—spiritual as "mental, intellectual" versus carnal as "fleshy, material"—for many things that were spiritual for St. Paul are very material, such as the matter of the sacraments, the resurrected body of Christ, and our own resurrected bodies. And again, a profound mind was very "intellectual" for St. Paul, but very carnal because it was not furthered nor animated by the Holy Spirit.

The antithesis lies rather in the fact that the Holy Spirit inspires and informs the activities of man according to the ideals of Christ. Although a man can be very "carnal" in his intention, still if he is working, even unconsciously, for an objective ideal of Christ, his activity has an objective Christian sense: "The works of the Spirit are manifest; they are love, joy, peace, long-suffering, affability, self-control" (*Gal. 5:25*).

Thus, in Christianity, there are good works and activities which have a value in themselves, inspired by the Holy Spirit according to the objective will of Christ; for instance, peace, self-control, etc. These activities are not directly dependent upon the intention of the person performing them, which might be indifferent or even hostile to Christianity. In furthering, for example, any project of brotherly love (for example, a world-wide organization trying to provide education, medicine and food for starving millions; or a work of international justice such as a United Nations trying to establish equitable trade agreements) is an objective work of Christ in the world inspired by the Holy Spirit. This human activity, therefore, has a value—a divine and Christian value according to the ideals of Christ—of its own right: "*Quod bonum est tenete*" (*I Thess. 5:21*).

One is struck by the Biblical view of men and matter. Nowhere do we find a Platonic separation and disdain for matter as opposed to man's spiritual qualities. The Biblical picture places

man as intimately bound up with matter in his own nature and in the world about him—matter which is weak, yet which has to be spiritualized (in the above-mentioned sense of St. Paul) and redeemed: "And the Word was made Flesh" (*John* 1:18) and flesh was thus purified by God's action. But matter remains and, in a sense, is glorified both by creation and by the Incarnation of the Son of God. In St. John's Prologue, we see the profound theological connection of the initial creation of the world and the coming of the Son of God. They form but two parts of the one original plan of creation.

Progress and human activity can be ambiguous in that they can certainly be used for evil. We have only to review the past 50 years to see realized, in effect, the fears of those who distrust and even brand as diabolical, these advances of mankind. But misuse is not the use, nor is the principle lost by the *distorted use* of the principle by evil men. The principle is the *why* and the *where* of human progress, and not the *how come*.

This question is of supreme importance when we look at the activities of most of our laymen, as doctors, lawyers, industrialists, sociologists and numerous others in every field of human endeavor. Can we explain the fullness of God's reality by the sanctification of our laymen "in spite of" or even "outside of" their temporal occupations? Even the excellent notion of bringing Christ into our activities, good and valid as it may be, is simply not enough. There is still an apparent break between the two activities of God and of man. Where does the work of the doctor and research man in their fight against suffering and death have a signification of its own right, over and above a simple reference to preparing man for the world to come, making this valley of tears a little more comfortable place to prepare for eternity? No Christian would deny that this is *one* of the objects of medicine, but is this its total signification? Once again there is a kind of break and separation where there should be none.

Whether human progress and technology are preludes of the glorious state of the world to come (that is, an inauguration even now of that which will be fully in the world to come); or simply prefigurations of that definite glorious state, is an open question. But we can see in the struggle against suffering and death an attempt by man, even now on this earth, to realize in partial degree,

the glorious Kingdom of Christ where there will be "neither suffering nor groan nor tear." Can we not see, therefore, in the manifold sciences an attempt to rationalize matter—to bring man into that intimate harmony with nature which was originally intended by God before the Fall, and which will be fully accomplished in the glorious world to come? Even in the psychological sciences can we not see an attempt to integrate man with himself and his brothers—an attempt which has a true religious significance of its own right? "Nature in its turn will be set free from the tyranny of corruption, to share in the glorious freedom of God's sons" (*Rom.* 8:21).

The spiritual connotations of this notion are significant. But one thing is certain. In the Christian concept, all human activity, technology, work, or progress can have a definite Christian meaning in furthering the cause of Christ on this earth—a cause of justice, of love and of peace as willed by the Saviour Himself. Human activity, then, has a Christian meaning of its own right.

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THE MORAL VIRTUES IN ST. THOMAS

I

As is well known, St. Thomas after developing his theory of habit and virtues in general in the *Prima Secundae* presents a detailed exposition of the Theological and Cardinal Moral Virtues in the *Secunda Secundae*. The present article aims to provide a convenient summary of the main lines of St. Thomas' teaching on Prudence, Fortitude and Temperance as contained in the passages of the *Summa* just referred to.

PRUDENCE: II-II, qq. 47-56

Man lives rightly by following reason and the Eternal Law. It is Prudence's office to formulate and impose the correct dictates of reason upon a man. To do this, it must take counsel; judge; and finally command. Since taking counsel involves an inquiry into means to end, Prudence is in the practical intellect. To command is the principal act of Prudence, for, inasmuch as it is the closest of these three acts to the human act, it is most influential in man's conduct. Since a man will be influenced in his judgment by the bent of his affections, to have Prudence one must have the other moral virtues, in order that his affections be inclined in the right way and so do not deflect his judgment from the truth.

Prudence *presupposes* the ends of the moral virtues and steers a course that will attain these ends. By fixing correctly on these means, the mean of the various virtues (their respective ends) is attained.

Since Prudence must direct man in the actual affairs of human life, the prudent man is in need of a knowledge both of the *general principles* of practical reason and of the manifold variety of contingent *singular* events to which he applies them. Prudence, of course, is concerned with regulating *future* conduct, since the past and the present are fixed.

In order to cope with practical decisions, the prudent man has need of many acts (Prudence's integral parts). He must employ *memory* to recall the past, and thus to foretell the future, by forming his estimate upon what generally happens. He must *understand* first principles in order to reason correctly about actions to

be performed; because of the quasi-infinite variety of contingent matters he will require instruction from the wise and so he must be *docile*. On his own, he must be *discerning* in order to proceed swiftly to a right estimate of what means will procure an end. From truths grasped he must be able to *reason*, since taking counsel requires passing from the known to the unknown. Since he must arrange contingent future events as means to an end, he must *foresee* these. Since circumstances can render an otherwise good course of action, evil or ineffectual of the end, one must regard these by *circumspection*. As evil often lies mixed with good, one must *cautiously* guard against it.

The command of Prudence may regard one's own conduct merely (Monastic Prudence); or that of the family one rules (Domestic Prudence); or that of the entire community one governs (Regnative Prudence) or that whereby one obeys his ruler reasonably (Political Prudence); finally, it may concern the defense of the state by armed resistance (Military Prudence). Such are Prudence's Species or Subjective Parts.

Prudence's own proper act is to command *well*. This is an act of reason whereby one intimates to the powers of execution what they are to do, but it presupposes an act of the will still influencing, in virtue of which the command effects the obedience of the powers of execution. Now, one is in a position to *command* only after having *judged* aright. Hence a subordinate and allied virtue is required to regulate judgment; in fact, two such are needed: the first to assist one in judging by the ordinary laws (Synesis); the other to aid in judging by extraordinary laws (Gnome). Judgment itself, if it is not to be *precipitate*, must follow on due inquiry. Hence another virtue insuring proper inquiry is also presupposed, scil. that of Good Counsel (Euboulia).

Every virtuous act shares in Prudence in that it is directed by Prudence. Similarly every vicious act contains a deficiency of due Prudence in that Prudence fails effectively to direct aright. This privation of Prudence (or lack of the Prudence), that one could and ought to have, can be divided more specifically according to the various acts of reason needed for Prudence, to which the potential parts of Prudence (Euboulia, Synesis, Gnome) and Prudence Proper correspond. Thus one *fails* in the principal act of Prudence (Command) either through failing to solicit the intellect to com-

mand as it should and when it should (Negligence or lack of due solicitude); or by failing to carry out the execution of the command (Inconstancy). Inconstancy is attributable to an inordinate desire for pleasure which seduces one from his good resolution. Thus Lust (whereby one is debauched by the most engrossing of all pleasures: venereal sensations) is especially corruptive of Prudence. In the stages anterior to command, one may fail to make due inquiry by taking proper counsel (Precipitateness). By Precipitateness one is borne into a conclusion by an impulse of will or passion, instead of proceeding in an orderly fashion by the steps already indicated in the integral parts of Prudence. Again, if after taking Counsel, one were to fail to pass judgment on the means, he would be defective in Prudence by Inconsiderateness.

Since Prudence concerns not ends but the *means* to ends (whereas the decalogue regards ends chiefly), no special commandment was given regarding Prudence. Nevertheless, Prudence's necessity is implicitly inculcated in enjoining the ends.

Since a lower principle is aided by its corresponding higher principle, the Gift of Counsel (whereby one is made amenable to the guidance of the Holy Spirit) corresponds to the virtue of Prudence. The infused virtue of Prudence is in all who have grace.

If one takes as the end of human life some false end, he is said to have a false or counterfeit Prudence. Thus those who make fleshly pleasure life's end are said to be "prudent according to the Flesh." This is, of course, a grave deordination. Prudence of the Flesh is a mortal sin if fleshly pleasure is made the end of life in its entirety; venial, if one seeks pleasure in a portion of life with some excess. The *proper* care of the body for a true end of life, however, is not prudence of the flesh.

Thinking out wrong ways of getting one's end pertains to craftiness; effecting these, to deceit. Fraud, too, can effect crafty plans—but by deeds only.

Solicitude can be sinful if we (1) take temporal good as life's end; (2) allow excessive concern over temporal affairs to withdraw us from spiritual; (3) have too much fear (as when, even after due care, one is yet anxious lest he lack temporal goods). This the Lord excluded for three reasons: (1) God has given greater goods; (2) God cares for lesser beings; (3) Divine Providence.

FORTITUDE: II-II, qq. 123-140

When danger threatens, two passions are aroused in man and they struggle for supremacy: fear and daring. The one dictates flight from the evil; the other dictates a counterattack upon the threatening evil. The accomplished brave man knows how to moderate these tendencies and follow a reasonable course employing his well-governed passions in achieving this end. Such self-control is no accident; nor is it acquired in a day. It derives from reason plotting out a course and imposing it upon lower appetite, where the passions reside. When this is done again and again, finally lower appetite is bent to obey reason in this matter. The virtue of Fortitude has been induced into lower appetite through the insistent requirements of reason's command, Prudence's chief act.

It is the part of the brave man in the face of threatening evils to withstand fear and moderate daring. Fortitude requires, therefore, both that one endure the onslaught of apprehended evil, and that he resist the evil forcibly but not rashly. Controlling fear by resisting the impulse to surrender or flee pertains more to Fortitude than does holding daring in check. For the latter is largely effected by the threatening evil itself, whereas the former must derive from one's own vigor of soul.

As virtues render a man and his work good, the principal field of this virtue concerns itself with what most of all opposes it: danger of death. Furthermore, these dangers must be undergone for some virtuous end, v.g., to defend one's country in a just war, or to resist danger in pursuing some private good (as when one does not desist from caring for a sick friend despite danger of mortal infection). Thus in one or the other sense, the danger withstood by Fortitude is incurred in the carrying on of a warfare.

One who practices Fortitude suffers in the body because of the hardships endured there; hence on the level of the bodily appetite there is sadness. But in the will one has reason to be glad in that he is practicing virtue. Since the bodily pain can neutralize the joy of soul in doing virtuous deeds, it is not required that the brave man positively rejoice: it suffices that he be not sad; for the delight of virtue overcomes his sadness in that it makes him elect the good.

Sudden occurrences are especially manifestative of Fortitude; for virtue acts like a new nature and is exhibited particularly in surprising events when one acts without premeditation, by reason

of the facility possessed by the good habit. But electing to cultivate Fortitude requires deliberation. Moreover, even the brave man, if time serves, will strengthen his soul by foreseeing danger he may encounter.

The employment of passions in accord with reason pertains to virtue. Hence the man of courage utilizes anger, moderated according to reason, for the practice of Fortitude.

Those virtues are called cardinal which possess in a pre-eminent way some characteristic that pertains to all virtue. Firmness is such a characteristic and it is possessed outstandingly by Fortitude. This is evident since the man of Fortitude adheres to virtue's path, although it lead him to confront the most appalling of all dangers—that of death.

In determining the relative excellence of one of the moral virtues, the test is: Which possesses more fully man's good (which is that of reason)? Prudence has this most of all among the moral virtues, since it possesses it essentially; next comes Justice, which effects the good of reason in human affairs. Then comes Fortitude, which resists the greatest obstacles to reason's good, scil., dangers of death. Next follows Temperance.

Martyrdom evinces the good of Fortitude in an eminent degree. It endures the greatest of evils, even death itself, to attest the truth of the Faith. Such toleration of death shares in the worth of the virtuous end to which it is ordered. Hence if commanded by Charity, the greatest virtue, Martyrdom is the supreme act of virtue in that it evinces the greatest love of God. For love is greater as we are willing to give up more good or suffer more odious evil for its sake. "Greater love than this no man hath than that he lay down his life for his friend" (*John 15:13*).

Fear is but the reverse of love: one fears the *loss* of the good one loves. Fear is sinful only if it is unreasonable: scil., if one flies what one ought not to fly. If such fear takes place in the sense appetite only, then at most a venial sin can occur, scil.—when reason could and ought to have prevented it. But if it reach the will, then it can be serious—scil., when one, for fear's sake, foregoes the observance of a gravely binding law of God.

It is licit through fear to avoid what is more evil by tolerating a lesser evil. So one might give goods to robbers to avoid death. Apart from the fear, some sin would be present here in bestowing

gifts on evil men while passing over the good in need. In any case, fear somewhat diminishes guilt in that what is done through fear is less voluntary than what is done without fear.

By having too small a love for certain goods, v.g., life or health, one can fall into a deficiency of fear of the loss of these goods. Such a lack of proper fear is against Fortitude, to which it pertains to moderate fear in accordance with reason. A cause inducing such deficiency of fear is Pride: one presumes that such danger cannot befall *him*. In like manner one can be excessively daring. This involves a sin contrary to Fortitude, which regulates daring as well as fear.

There are, moreover, certain acts which must concur in order that Fortitude be practiced. It is the part of Fortitude both to attack and to withstand evil, as we have already seen. In order to attack aright, one must have his mind prepared by *Confidence*, whereby he trusts to achieve his good. Furthermore, he stands in need of *Enterprise* (*Magnificentia*) to see through the execution of what he undertakes. If these attitudes are confined to Fortitude's proper subject matter (dangers of death), they are regarded as its quasi-integral parts. If they are extended to include other less difficult subject matter, they are regarded as its potential parts (*Magnanimity* and *Enterprise*).

Enduring evil likewise requires two attitudes of mind. One must resist the sadness that evils cause, so as not to fail of his purpose. Patience supplies this need. Moreover, the longer evil lasts, the more wearing it is; to bear this weariness so as not to give up, pertains to Perseverance. As applied to Fortitude's proper subject matter, these attitudes of mind are the quasi-integral parts of this virtue; as applied to other less difficult matter, they are the potential parts of Fortitude.

Passions can resist reason; some do so by reason of themselves; others do so in virtue of the stimulus they receive from external goods such as richness or honors. Since the sense appetite is naturally subject to reason, passions that oppose reason in virtue of themselves do so only when vehement; hence the virtues which are required to govern these regard only the advanced stage of passion—Temperance with respect to the great pleasures of the touch; Fortitude with respect to great fear and daring; Meekness with respect to great anger. Passions concerned with external things

need a two-fold virtue, one to govern the response to great external things, v. g., great honors (Magnanimity) and great expenditures (Enterprise); a pair to govern the response to lesser honors (Philotimia: inclining one to merit such honors when this is reasonable; and Aphilotimia: inclining one to disregard the attraction of such honors, when that is reasonable); yet another to govern outlay of lesser sums (Liberality).

The stretching forth of the soul, purposing some great act worthy of great honor, forms the special matter of Magnanimity. Greatness here is taken absolutely: not great merely for the talent of the one in question, but great for men in general. Hence this virtue belongs to men of great talent only; Magnanimity is related to Fortitude as secondary to chief virtue since it applies the same attitude of mind (Firmness) to a subject less difficult than Fortitude's, scil., deserving great honors, as opposed to dangers of death in combat.

Magnanimity requires that a man have Confidence: a hope auguring success, based on some promising quality which he perceives in himself, or in some friend who will help him, or in both. Since the goods of fortune can be made organically to serve the ends of Magnanimity, they have a bearing on this virtue.

Magnanimity inclines one to aspire to some great achievement that is proportionate to the power of the aspirant. This accords with the law of nature, which assigns accomplishments to proportionate powers. This excludes presumption, which aims at what is beyond one's power.

As what is honorable in a man is given to him by God, the attestation of this excellence (honor) is due primarily to God. Moreover, honor is useful in that it makes one to be of service to others. Hence one can have an inordinate appetite for honor (ambition) in three ways: (1) by seeking honor that is not due to him; (2) by not referring the honor to God; (3) by not referring it to the neighbor's utility.

Glory is the proclaiming of something as decorous. One is not forbidden to acknowledge his own worth: Cf. *I Cor.* 2:12: "Now we have not received the spirit of the world, but the spirit that is from God, that we may know the things that have been given us from God"; or to desire that others know it: Cf. *Matt.* 5:6: "Even so let your light shine before men in order that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father in Heaven."

Desiring empty glory is vicious; desire for glory is empty if: (1) one seeks to be glorified when no true basis exists for glory; (2) one seeks glory at the hands of those unable to appraise one's worth; (3) one fails to refer the glory to God's honor and our neighbor's good.

Such empty or vain glory is opposed to Magnanimity, which regulates one's attitude towards honor (since glory ensues upon honor). It would be against Charity, and a serious sin, if one were to make his own glorification his ultimate end. Vainglory can also be serious if one takes glory in offending God.

Vainglory fulfills the notion of a capital vice: one with a special subject matter, for the sake of which men are prone to commit other sins. Examples of such sins are: vaunting one's accomplishments, whether real or fanciful; presuming to innovate customs in order to arouse men's admiration or even falsifying one's achievements hypocritically; holding too strongly to one's own opinions in order not to appear less than others (pertinacity); refusing to accede to others' desires (discord); opposing others loudly in speech (contention); refusing to submit to authority (disobedience).

Every natural agent tends to achieve what is proportionate to its powers; this is assured by Magnanimity; the pusillanimous man falls short in this. This may be due to ignorance of one's capacities or fear of failing in what one erroneously regards as beyond his powers. The result is that the pusillanimous man is impeded from the great achievements which he could accomplish.

Taking Enterprise (*Magnificentia*) as a special virtue, its field covers great achievements outside the agent. Such great external accomplishments require a sizeable outlay of funds. These funds themselves, or the spending of them, or the affection for them which the enterprising man does not allow to withhold him from great achievements, can be regarded as the special subject matter of Enterprise (*Magnificentia*).

Enterprise is like Fortitude, in aspiring to some goal which is hard to get; unlike it, in that its matter (laying out large sums for some external achievement of magnitude) is less difficult than that of Fortitude, which is withstanding dangers of death. It is therefore classified as a potential part of Fortitude.

If one forego a great achievement because of excessive love of money (which he is unwilling to part with for the venture), he is

deficient in Enterprise (*Magnificentia*) and may be called niggardly. On the other hand, one may be all too ready to expend money: throwing sums away on unworthy projects: wasteful.

One obstacle to moral achievement is sadness. Conserving the good of reason against sadness pertains to Patience. Now one supports pain only for the sake of a good which he loves more than he detests the pain. Only Charity can bring it about that one loves the Divine good more than he detests the evils which temporal things can inflict. Thus Charity is required to support Patience: "Charity is patient" (*I Cor.* 13:4). Now Charity is given to us by God with grace: "The Charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit Who has been given to us" (*Rom.* 5:5). Hence Patience requires sanctifying grace. If Patience be considered as supporting with equanimity evils befalling us from without—evils less than the dangers of death (Fortitude's proper field)—it is classified as a potential part of Fortitude.

By Longanimity one inclines toward a good as yet far off. Since the very deferring of a hoped for good engenders sadness, Patience (which resists sadness) applies here and can be said to include Longanimity.

Similarly the labor entailed in the long drawn out performance of a good work can give rise to sadness. Constancy in such work can be seen to derive from Patience, therefore. In fact, all difficulties deriving from sources other than sheer delay in the pursuit of good are overcome by Constancy.

Withstanding delays in the doing of good pertains to Perseverance. Insofar as this doing of good does not require that one confront the danger of death (Fortitude's proper subject), Perseverance is a potential part of Fortitude, for it gives one an attitude similar to the principal virtue (Firmness of mind) but in respect to less difficult subject matter. Considered as an infused moral virtue, Perseverance is a concomitant of sanctifying grace. Opposed to Perseverance by way of deficiency is Softness: a defect whereby one is induced to cease striving for good just because pleasures are lacking. The pertinacious man through vainglory adheres overmuch to his own opinion and so fails by excess in the virtue of Perseverance.

There is, besides the virtue of Fortitude, the *Gift* of the same name. This is a habit whereby one is disposed to be amenable to

the Divine Spirit's influence in bringing a man to terminate a work well and avoid evils. Since man does not suffice for this he requires the divine aid: God infuses a certain confidence that all will be well herein.

(To be continued)

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FIFTY YEARS AGO

The leading article in *The American Ecclesiastical Review* for August, 1910, is the first of a series by Fr. F. G. Holweck, of St. Louis, on "The Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary." The purpose of the writer is to prove that the doctrine of Our Lady's Assumption rests entirely on dogmatic, rather than historical arguments. In this first article he attempts to show that until the end of the fifth century there was no explicit mention of this privilege of Mary in the works of ecclesiastical writers. . . . Fr. Edward Byrne, writing from Jerusalem, describes (with photographs) the various types of tombs common among the Jewish people in the time of Christ. He tells us that the stone which was rolled before the door of Our Lord's sepulchre was not a boulder (as it is often portrayed) but rather a round disk, proportionate to the size of the opening, similar to a millstone. . . . Fr. A. Brucker, S.J., continues his series on "Ecclesiastical Heraldry." He criticizes some of the seals used by chanceries in the United States, on the ground that they are not in full conformity with the laws of heraldry. . . . Fr. M. Martin, S.J., discusses some canonical aspects of the "sanatio in radice." . . . Fr. R. O'Connor, of Ireland, continues his biography of Pere Marie-Antoine, O.F.M. Cap., under the title "The Story of a Modern Capuchin." . . . The *Analecta* section contains the Encyclical of Pope Pius X on the occasion of the third centenary of the canonization of St. Charles Borromeo, *Editae saepe*, condemning the errors of Modernism. . . . A correspondent blames *The American Ecclesiastical Review* for not devoting space to current events, such as the recent failure of Theodore Roosevelt to visit the Pope. The editor replies that it is not the policy of the *Review* to discuss modern happenings that are sufficiently covered in other periodicals, but to treat of subjects that are not found in other current publications.

F. J. C.

CALIFORNIA'S FIRST ARCHBISHOP: A VISIT TO VICH

An ancient and distinguished church in Rome is that called San Carlo al Corso. Within its sanctuary, on St. Joseph's Day, March 19, 1925, our present Holy Father was consecrated a titular Archbishop before entering upon his difficult office of Apostolic Visitor to Bulgaria. The student of California's Catholicism sees an interesting connection between the consecration of Angelo Giuseppe Cardinal Roncalli in this church and the earlier history of the Catholic church in his state for, exactly seventy-five years before, a young Dominican friar had prostrated himself on the same sanctuary floor and had risen to accept, under obedience from Pius IX, the burden of the episcopate as Bishop of Monterey in California. Only thirty-six years old at the time, Joseph Sadoc Alemany was to have the distinction, and this for thirty-one years, of serving as California's first Archbishop. It is thought that, with the present and rapid growth of Catholicism in California and with that proof of maturity to which membership in the Sacred College of Cardinals entitles it, a sketch of this humble and holy prelate's life and labors might be of interest.

Joseph Sadoc Alemany was born in the ancient and proud city of Vich in Catalonia in 1814 and died in Valencia in his native land in 1888. At his request, his remains were interred in the church of Santo Domingo in Vich, for this had been the scene of his entrance into the Dominican Order when only fifteen years old. After six years of preliminary training as a Dominican, the young friar was forced to flee Spain at the suppression of religious orders there, and he was sent to Viterbo in Italy where, on March 27, 1837, he was ordained to the priesthood by Bishop Gaspar Pianetti. In 1840 this born missionary was assigned to Ohio in the far distant United States where his brother Dominicans had already established themselves. That he wished to identify himself completely with the American scene is testified to by the fact that, on October 27, 1845, he was naturalized as an American citizen in Memphis, Tennessee.

In 1847, Father Alemany was made Master of Novices in Kentucky and, finally, Dominican Provincial of the mid-west in 1849.

Early in 1850, a general chapter of his Order was called to meet in Rome and Father Alemany, presumably completely ignorant of the "blow" that was to descend upon him, set out for the Eternal City. The later utterances of Friar Joseph Sadoc (including his historic remark made upon his retirement from the See of San Francisco in 1888: "I do not think that I was made to be a Bishop and I told Pius IX so; nevertheless, they made me a Bishop!") make it completely evident that no episcopal desires, either overt or covert, were in his mind as he prepared for the long journey to Rome.

While there, he was unexpectedly summoned by His Holiness, Pope Pius IX, who told him of the need of a shepherd for the orphaned church in California. It had been four years since the first Bishop there, a Franciscan named Garcia Diego, had died at Santa Barbara. Now, said the Holy Father, with the discovery of gold in California and with the influx of thousands to that Promised Land, it was imperative that a young and vigorous prelate be quickly consecrated and sent there as soon as possible. Knowledge of Spanish and English was of the essence and the fact that young Father Alemany was now a citizen of the United States would be very much in his favor. It would appear that the friar endeavored to plead personal unworthiness and other reasons in an effort to escape the mitre, but it is known that Pius IX commanded obedience and told Friar Joseph Sadoc that he was to receive consecration before leaving Rome. Consequently, on Sunday, June 30, 1850, the Feast of St. Paul the Apostle, California's counterpart to Paul was consecrated as a successor of the apostles by Cardinal Franzoni. It would not seem far-fetched to think that through his mind might well have been running the fatherly words of Pius IX who, in ordering his consecration, had said to the dismayed friar: "Others go to California to seek gold: you should go to carry the Cross!"

In a sense, Bishop Alemany was a Columbus of California, for the discovery of gold there in 1848 had made the land a brave new world, needing the services of an intrepid Shepherd. At all events, it does seem an interesting coincidence that Alemany should cross the Atlantic on the packet ship "Columbus," that he should have arrived in New York on Columbus Day, October 12, 1850 and that, finally, he should have sailed in through the

Golden Gate on a Panama steamer likewise called "Columbus!" For three years, and under pioneer conditions which required all of his ingenuity and strength, Bishop Alemany served as the occupant of the See of Monterey. Actually, for much of the time, he was the Bishop of both Californias, Upper and Lower, his territory extended eastward for thousands of miles.

Rome was satisfied with what must be called a distinguished stewardship and, on July 29, 1853, when only thirty-nine years old, Joseph Sadoc Alemany was appointed first Archbishop of San Francisco. In that capacity, he was to serve for thirty-one years until old age caused his resignation in 1884. With this generous act, not forced upon him but one of his own choosing, Archbishop Alemany elected to return to his native Spain, there to spend the rest of his days amidst familiar surroundings. That he had always regarded the episcopate as a burden, and that he had remained humble in high office, is amply demonstrated by the words which he used in responding to an address made him by his clergy on the eve of his departure from San Francisco on May 19, 1885: "Now, in my old age, it has seemed best to resign the arduous work into younger hands. I hope that you will pray for me that God may preserve me through life and particularly at the hour of death." Quite in character, too, was his last and affectionate farewell to his flock in St. Mary's Cathedral as he offered Mass. He insisted on personally communicating all who presented themselves and uttered a little homily on the "Immortality of the Soul."

Back to Spain, full of merits and of days, went California's first Archbishop and there, four years later, he died. Critical pages of accurate history remain to be written before the full stature and measure of the man emerges from the pages of history; as a student of the life and labors of this lovable friar Bishop, we feel confident that a distinguished man and a distinguished career will unfold when this final assessment has been made. Like Junipero Serra before him, Alemany really grows in stature as one learns more about him from reading his correspondence as preserved in various European and American Archives, notably those of the Sacred Congregation "De Propaganda Fide" in Rome.

Finally a word in regard to Vich. It is required not only by a desire to add another and vital dimension to the story of Alemany

by describing the city of his birth and of his burial but, additionally, by the discovery that Vich properly honors its son much as the little town of Petra on the not-too-distant isle of Mallorca honors Junipero Serra as the first Apostle and Founder of the Catholic Church in California. The grand-nephew of Archbishop Alemany, Antonio Alemany Comella, a man in his middle seventies, is a devoted student of his ancestor's career; he has written a biography of California's First Archbishop. And so it was with a high anticipation which turned out to be completely satisfied that I made my way to Vich via Barcelona where, first, contact was made with members of the Alemany family.

In their residence in Barcelona there are two mitres worn by their distinguished episcopal relative, in addition to the gloves worn by him in episcopal functions and a green pectoral cross cord. But more significant and rewarding was the gift made by Senor Antonio himself of one of his two remaining copies (which I now possess) of his *Biografia del Ilmo. y Rmo. Fray Jose Sadoc Alemany Conill, O.P., Obispo de Monterey Y Primer Arzobispo de San Francisco de California*.

Quite naturally, it was that visit to Vich itself, made in the company of Senor Antonio and his adult son, which proved of most interest. Vich is situated about thirty miles or so from Barcelona; I found that it would be possible for me to offer Mass in the venerable church of Santo Domingo at an altar practically in the shadow of the tomb of California's first Archbishop, using the very chalice which Archbishop Alemany had brought with him from California at the time of his retirement. Later on in the day, conversation with Senor Antonio brought out the interesting fact that, during the prolonged period in which the Reds occupied Vich during the Spanish Civil War, many tombs in churches such as Santo Domingo had been desecrated. Due, however, to the fortunate circumstance that the exact site of Alemany's remains was unknown to them, these same enemies of religion were unable to destroy it. After liberation, Senor Antonio, benefiting by a constant but unwritten tradition in his family as to the exact place of Alemany's sepulture, obtained permission from the Bishop of Vich to locate and identify the coffin. This he did with complete success and a notarial document now reposes in the Vich diocesan archives testifying to this fact.

An imposing memorial tablet placed on a wall above the tomb recounts, in classical Latin, the career of Vich's most distinguished missionary prelate. The city has also placed an informative tablet outside the house of his birth and, in the local Council Chamber, there is an oil painting of the Archbishop. Evidence that Vich is indeed an ancient town is had when one stands before the excellently preserved temple of pagan times and finds that Vich's illustrious citizens have their names inscribed on separate pillars. One has the name "Alamany" (local spelling) on it and shows among other things, that Vich has proper cognizance of the distinction which is its in having been the birthplace of California's first Archbishop.

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DOCTOR OF REUNION

During the last year or so, there has been an ever-increasing interest in the question of the reunion of Christianity. While this does not indicate the primary purpose of the forthcoming General Council, it is nevertheless evident that Pope John XXIII is greatly interested in this matter, and that he may hope for some advance in this regard because of the work of this Council. As a result, sincere Protestants and Catholics throughout the world have begun to turn their attention to the problems which face them if such a topic is to be considered at all.

It is perhaps providential that when these various groups are turning their attention to this precise problem, the Church should name as a Doctor of the Church a man who lived out his life with the hope of contributing to a reunited Christianity: the Capuchin St. Lawrence of Brindisi. He was one of the greatest apologists of the post-Reformation era, having written many works that dealt with the questions of this period. He devoted three large volumes to Lutheranism alone.

Any possible work of reunion will obviously demand mutual sincerity and understanding. Continued name-calling will not help in this work. Catholics need above all to try and understand what has led the Protestant to his present conviction. It is only by trying to grasp *his* point of view that we may hope to answer his precise problems.

St. Lawrence may be taken as a safe guide in this regard. His works will aid in understanding the heretical positions adopted in the sixteenth century; but they will also provide the example to be followed in dealing with those who have separated themselves from the bark of Peter.

What is particularly noteworthy about St. Lawrence is the *manner* in which he combatted these sixteenth century heretics. Since many false accusations against the Church were associated with problems concerning the interpretation of the Bible, especially the matter of private interpretation, Lawrence fully realized the need of as accurate an understanding as possible of what the Scriptures really said and meant. In order to equip himself for this, he

studied and mastered the Greek, Syriac and Chaldaic languages. He already knew enough Hebrew to speak it fluently.

Even with this tremendous background of biblical knowledge, however, Lawrence did not yet consider himself fit to refute the Lutherans. Not until he could honestly say that he really understood *them* and *their* problems would he attempt any refutation. Lawrence listened to their speeches and took copious notes of what they said. Gradually he began to develop his own answers. When at last he was ready to meet them on their own grounds, he was able to refute their arguments point by point. When someone would raise an objection based on a text from Scripture, Lawrence was able to quote the text in its original language and go on to explain its meaning; naturally this knowledge of the scriptural language and its history strengthened his arguments. Many were completely dumbfounded by his scholarship. Nevertheless, in his apologetical discussions, Lawrence was most careful never to offend anyone. His purpose was to bring truth to these people, and not simply to mock those whom they looked upon as men of God.

Lawrence had a special affection for the Jews. Clement VIII commissioned him to work for the conversion of the Jews of Rome. He was successful not only because he could speak to them in their own language, but because he sympathized with their problems, while remaining adamant in Catholic doctrine. So great was his understanding of their feelings that at Mantua, where the crowds often molested the Jews, Lawrence persuaded the Duke to assign them a quarter of the city for their residence. He even had all Christian emblems removed. It was such deep sympathy and understanding of the feelings of those outside the fold that eventually helped to win them for Christ.

One might expect that anyone so concerned with Sacred Scripture as was St. Lawrence would base all his arguments on Scripture alone. Yet this was not the case. He had a reverence and devotion for the Church also, and insisted upon its authority and the authority of Christian tradition as a teacher of divine truth. This is a point often overlooked when discussing religion with Protestants; some fail to bring to their attention the need for some other authority in the matter of interpreting the written Word of God. St. Lawrence of Brindisi was not of that mind. His own words on this matter bear quoting; they clearly reflect the spirit of Trent:

We know . . . that Sacred Scripture rightly understood is the most sure norm or rule of truth, but not alone; for the Holy Fathers . . . have united to the canon of the Divine Scriptures the witness of ecclesiastical tradition. For the Church, which is the support and prop of the truth, sustains the authority of the Sacred Letters. St. Augustine says: "I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me to do so." We do not consider the Word of God written in the heart of the Church by the Spirit of the Living God to be of less authority than that written by pen on parchment. Nor does the application of the pen to parchment give authority to the Word of God, but the belief of the Church does. The Word of God written on paper has authority only from the Word of God written in her heart.

St. Lawrence would make such a statement because he realized that the authority of Christian tradition will necessarily play an important part in any attempt to explain the faith to those outside the Church.

It is in this precise point concerning authority that Catholics must necessarily differ with Protestants. The Bible was written in a language that is not understood apart from a knowledge of the original languages. In addition, language difficulties also involve historical problems; it is not enough to know what the word says: we have to know also what the word *means* in a particular context.

It is not, however, on the authority of knowledge or scholastic competence that we ultimately take our stand, but on the authority of God's guidance and direction evidenced in the supernatural life of the Church. When Christ said: "I am with you all days even to the consummation of the world," He meant exactly what He said. He is with the Church that He founded; He guides it through His Holy Spirit. This authority, rooted in Peter, was given to the Catholic Church by Christ for all times. This was the constant message of St. Lawrence. No matter how black the picture might have appeared in the fifteenth century, Christ was still with His Church. The reform which saved the Church came, not from Luther, but from the Roman Pontiffs who called, guided and completed the work of the Council of Trent. It was these Popes, and the bishops associated with them, who called on St. Lawrence of Brindisi and a host of others, to preach the true reform to the people of Europe.

This same Church has now raised Lawrence to the select rank of Doctor of the Universal Church, joining him with Athanasius,

Augustine, Cyril of Jerusalem, Leo the Great. Lawrence of Brindisi entered the Capuchin Order with the sole purpose of serving God in whatever task his superiors might assign him, but God chose to make him a light to the world, not just in the sixteenth century but for all time.

Because of his close association with the Reformers and his great sympathy for their views and the views of others, Catholics today can look to St. Lawrence in their efforts toward reunion. They can hope to imbibe some of his learning and understanding in regard to the problems of those who have been led away from the Shepherd of Rome. They may pray to him that he might intercede for the success of the coming Council. With the works and in the spirit of this man, they may go out to meet the non-Catholic world, and because of his help justly honor him with the title, Doctor of Reunion.

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NEWMAN AND THE THEORY OF DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT

In his *Autobiography*, John Stuart Mill stresses his opinion that the age in which he lived was an age of transition. Looking back to Mill's era with the perspective of a century, we see that his opinion was, for the most part, justified, and that in many ways the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the scientific discoveries and all the intellectual trends which they sired were, in fact, the means of change from the *ancien regime* of the 18th century to the "status seekers" of the 20th. During that 19th century period of transition, the very notion of *change* entered areas of speculation to an unprecedented extent. Three men, contemporaries one of another (two of them in English and the third English by adoption), used the notion of *change* in the sense of *development* in such a way as to affect profoundly our 20th century. Yet none of the three used the word or the idea in the same sense, nor were any of the three original in their specific applications of the notion. Each, however, had a peculiar genius for expounding and expressing his idea which assured the continuing application of his work by posterity. Karl Marx, with his study of Hegel's dialectic and the revolutionary philosophies of the French thinkers, has left his mark on our century in the political field, to mention only one. Charles Darwin's theory of biological evolution, written of before 1859 to be sure but without the evidence or the clarity of argument contained in the *Origin of Species*, has permanently altered the intellectual climate of more than merely the physical sciences. And John Henry Newman's monumental *Development of Christian Doctrine*, while itself greatly indebted to the work of the Jesuit Petavius¹ and an intellectual background as broad as the whole of the Christian centuries, has at least been an inspiration for, if not a direct cause of, much of the theological study carried out today from an historical approach. It is with Newman's theory of development that these pages shall concern themselves.

¹ Charles Frederick Harrold, *John Henry Newman* (New York: 1945), pp. 71-72.

John Henry Newman was born into an Evangelical middle-class family in London in 1801.² Although as a youth he read Paine and Hume and delighted in the plausibility of their skepticism, at the precocious age of fifteen he underwent an Evangelical conversion which greatly influenced his immediately succeeding years. Arriving at Oxford in June 1817, Newman began an intellectual odyssey which was to bring him to the Roman Catholic Church. In April of 1822 he was elected fellow of Oriel College and fell at once under the influence of the Oxford Noetics "who lured him toward a liberal and intellectual type of Christianity."³ After 1828 he veered further and further away from his incipient liberalism because of the influence of his high-church friend, Hurrell Froude; finally, from 1833 until his retirement to Littlemore before his reception into the Catholic Church, he was engaged in the activities of the Oxford Movement.

Basically, the Oxford Movement was an attempt on the part of certain Oxford clerics to stem the tide of liberalism of that day insofar as it threatened the existence of the Anglican Church. From the political point of view, it was an effort to prevent the disestablishment of the English Church, but from the religious or positive point of view, it was an effort to establish the Anglican position on doctrinal grounds which had their roots in Antiquity. Newman's intellectual relationship to the movement, insofar as it affected him personally, was to be a progression from the *Via Media* position to that of the *Development of Doctrine*. In 1835 Newman attempted in his lectures on "The Prophetical Office of the Church" to define the *Via Media* position which he understood as a half-way house between the "superstitious additions" in doctrine by the Church of Rome and the capricious deviations from doctrine by the Protestants.⁴ By 1840 his security in the *Via Media* position had been severely shaken by the lack of support which Bishop Bagot, his own bishop, had shown him; by his own re-examination of the early heresies of Monophysitism and Eutychianism in which he saw forerunners of his own position; and

² The biographical data supplied in these pages can best be supplemented by Harrold, *op. cit.*; Henry Tristram's edition of Newman's *Autobiographical Writings*; Louis Bouyer's *Newman, His Life and Spirituality*; and Newman's own *Apologia*.

³ Harrold, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁴ Newman, *Apologia* (New York: Image Books, 1956), p. 179.

by an article of Cardinal Wiseman's in which the phrase "*Securus judicat orbis terrarum*" brought home to him the insularity of the Anglican claim.⁵ On February 27, 1841 his famous Tract 90 was published, and he reaped a harvest of recrimination and condemnation for his efforts to show the possibility of interpreting the Thirty-Nine Articles in such a way as to save Catholic doctrine. About the same time, Canterbury commissioned an Anglican bishop of Jerusalem who also subscribed to the Confession of Augsburg as a political gesture to Prussia. In this way, Newman saw his efforts to maintain the Catholic character of Anglicanism dissolve before an official gesture of the Anglican bishops toward Protestantism.⁶ From 1842 until 1845, he lived in retirement at Littlemore; and on February 2, 1843 he preached his last sermon before the University: "The Theory of Development in Religious Doctrine," in which he maintained:

... reason has not only submitted, it has ministered to Faith; it has illustrated its documents; it has raised illiterate peasants into philosophers and divines; it has elicited a meaning from their words which their immediate hearers little suspected. Stranger surely is it that St. John should be a theologian, than that St. Peter should be a prince. This is a phenomenon proper to the Gospel, and a note of divinity. Its half sentences, its overflowings of language, admit of development; they have a life in them which shows itself in progress; a truth, which has the token of consistency; a reality, which is fruitful in resources; a depth, which extends into mystery: for they are representations of what is actual and has a definite location and necessary bearings and a meaning in the great system of things, and a harmony in what it is, and a combatibility in what it involves.⁷

The three and a half years at Littlemore produced his essay on the *Development of Christian Doctrine* and ended in his reception into the Roman Catholic Church. The book is an essay in the application of those doctrinal principles which Newman himself accepted as Christian, to the actual historical development of Christianity. In that the intellectual movement which it portrays also parallels the development of Newman's own religious thought, the book can be termed the story of his conversion.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 218-219.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 241-242.

⁷ Newman, *Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford*, (London: 1909), pp. 317-318.

In his introduction to the *Development*, Newman tells us that his essay will use the testimony of eighteen hundred years of Christian history to propound a view which he believes has "at all times, perhaps, been implicitly adopted by theologians." Thus he explains:

. . . that the increase and expansion of the Christian Creed and Ritual, and the variations which have attended the process in the case of individual writers and Churches, are the necessary attendants on any philosophy or polity which takes possession of the intellect and heart, and has had any wide or extended dominion; that, from the nature of the human mind, time is necessary for the full comprehension and perfection of great ideas; and that the highest and most wonderful truths, though communicated to the world once for all by inspired teachers, could not be comprehended all at once by the recipients, but, as being received and transmitted by minds not inspired and through media which were human, have required only the longer time and deeper thought for their full elucidation.⁸

The volume is divided into two main parts: the first part is concerned with "Doctrinal Developments Viewed in Themselves," and the second with "Doctrinal Developments Viewed Relatively to Doctrinal Corruptions." The first chapter explains the notion of the development of ideas. By an "idea" in its broadest sense Newman understands a judgment which becomes an aspect in our minds of a thing apprehended.⁹

The idea which represents an object or a supposed object is commensurate with the sum total of its possible aspects, however they may vary in the separate consciousness of individuals; and in proportion to the variety of aspects under which it presents itself to various minds is its force and depth, and the argument for its reality.¹⁰

That Christianity is an objective fact and, as such, can be apprehended in judgment by the individual, Newman has already established in his introduction. Consequently, all of his remarks about ideas in the abstract are meant to be applied to Christianity in the concrete. All aspects of an idea are capable of coalition and when explained are an argument for its integrity. No one aspect is deep enough to exhaust the contents of a real idea, though there are central aspects of an idea (as, for instance, the Incarnation

⁸ Newman, *Development of Christian Doctrine* (London: 1894), p. 29.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

could, in a certain sense, be considered the central aspect of Christianity).

After taking a static view of ideas, Newman next looks into the *dynamic* aspect of ideas. Ideas, he decides, have life when they so possess minds as to be a real motive force. When an idea gets possession of the popular mind or of a representative part of the community, its various aspects are (through argumentation, modification, comparison, reasoning, and so forth) synthesized into a definite doctrine which "will be to each mind separately what at first it was only to all together."¹¹ The effect of an idea on social life, its ability to change, strengthen, undermine, will be in proportion to the strength of the subtlety and native vigour of the idea itself. This process of becoming the motive force in the minds of a group, so that it is modified and amplified by the group, is Newman's notion of *development* in ideas, "being," as he says, "the germination and maturation of some truth or apparent truth on a large mental field."¹²

This process, though, will not be a true development unless all the aspects which constitute the ultimate shape of the idea actually belong to the idea from which they start. Because, using human minds as its instrument, an idea which affects social conditions must cut across opinions, principles, and ways of acting, changing their direction and incorporating whatever is compatible in them to itself, the history of the social application of ideas (i.e. politics, religion) is one of a polemical character. Too, ideas are modified and at least influenced by conditions in which they are carried out. But an idea must be expanded to its perfection by trials and by fighting off corruption of itself. For, says Newman, speaking of this travail of the idea in its movement toward perfection, "It is elicited and expanded by trial, and battles into perfection and supremacy."¹³

After these general remarks on the process of development in ideas, Newman goes on to discuss the *different kinds* of development in ideas. This is not an enumeration of thought processes but a clarification of different meanings and types of development. Mathematical, physical, and material developments are instanced

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

in order to be dismissed, and the conclusion is drawn that if the truths of Christianity admit of development it will be of the following five kinds: political, logical, historical, ethical, and metaphysical.

By political development he understands that in which "society and its various classes and interests are the *subject-matter* of the ideas which are in operation."¹⁴

By logical he means a development in which the *intellectual* character of the development is most prominent, so that the premise is seen to demand the conclusion and *vice versa*.

Newman would call a development historical when the gradual formation of opinion concerning persons, facts, events, is had by the accumulation and concurrence of *testimony*.

As principles imply applications and general propositions include particulars, so do certain relations imply correlative *duties* and certain objects demand certain *acts* and *feelings*. This implication and this demand Newman would call ethical developments.

A metaphysical development would be such as is a *mere analysis* of the idea contemplated and which terminates in its exact and complete delineation.

Exemplifying his types of development, Newman concludes: "Taking the Incarnation as its central doctrine, the Episcopate, as taught by St. Ignatius, will be an instance of political development, the *Theotokos* of logical, the determination of the date of our Lord's birth of historical, the Holy Eucharist of moral, and the Athanasian Creed of metaphysical."¹⁵

The second chapter develops the antecedent argument in behalf of developments in Christian doctrine by showing that developments are to be expected, that an infallible developing authority is to be expected, and that the existing developments of doctrine are the probable *fulfilments* of that expectation. Developments of doctrine are to be expected because the ideas contained in Scripture do not reach the reader in their fulness but open out in his intellect and grow to perfection with time. Too, Christianity is a universal religion and its principles are applied in various circumstances (i.e., false developments and errors or heresy demand

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

a true manifestation of doctrine which would not be made but for the vanquishing of the error). Moreover, the letter of Scripture needs explanation since, even though it speaks of mysteries, mysteries are at least in part comprehensible. There are also great questions existing in the subject matter of Scripture which Scripture does not solve (i.e., the question of the Canon of Scripture and its inspiration). And, finally, doctrinal developments are to be expected, because such is the history of every religious group, and the analogy and example of Scripture itself would lead one thus to anticipate (i.e., the completion of the prophecies of the Old Testament in the life and doctrine of Christ in the New).

After showing why doctrinal developments are to be expected, Newman summarizes his argument for anticipation of an infallible developing *authority* thus:

... if development must be, then, whereas Revelation is a heavenly gift, He who gave it virtually has not given it, unless He has also secured it from perversion and corruption, in all such development as comes upon it by the necessity of its nature, or, in other words, that the intellectual action through successive generations, which is the organ of development, must, so far forth as it can claim to have been put in charge of the Revelation, be in its determination infallible.¹⁶

He concludes this chapter by remarking that the existing Catholic doctrines today are the probable fulfilment of the development he has shown to be necessary, and, that if St. Athanasius and St. Ambrose were to walk abroad today, they would feel "more at home with such men as St. Bernard or St. Ignatius Loyola, or with the lonely priest in his lodging, or the holy sisterhood of mercy, or the unlettered crowd before the altar, than with the teachers or with the members of any other creed."¹⁷

In the third chapter Newman explains the *historical* argument in behalf of the existing developments. His method of proof will be to interpret the previous history of a doctrine by its later development and to consider whether it contains the later doctrine "*in posse*" and in the divine intention. As far as evidence is concerned, he does not have facts to work with in the same sense that the physical sciences have, but here antecedent probability

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

will have a real weight and cogency not had in experimental science. And he insists that he will retain his hypothesis until it is *proved* that "the Church herself, acting through Pope or Council as the oracle of heaven, has ever contradicted her own enunciations."¹⁸ The first part of the book then concludes with a chapter illustrating by examples the historical argument for the development of doctrine, with greatest emphasis on the Catholic doctrines of the dignity of the Blessed Mother of God and of the saints and on papal supremacy.

The second part of Newman's *Development* begins by listing seven notes which will distinguish true development of doctrine from false development or corruption. These distinguishing characteristics of genuine development are: (1) preservation of its type; (2) continuity of its principles; (3) its power of assimilation; (4) its logical sequence; (5) anticipation of its future; (6) conservative action upon its past; and (7) its chronic vigor.

The rest of the book is taken up with an application of the seven notes to the existing Catholic doctrines to see whether they can withstand such a scrutiny in the light of the whole history of Christianity and especially of the early centuries. Newman's knowledge of and familiarity with the Church of Ignatius, Athanasius, Polycarp, Ambrose, Chrysostom, and Augustine is detailed and penetrating. The volumes of the Fathers which he bought and studied as a fellow of Oriel began to yield their full value during his last months at Littlemore. In applying the seven notes,¹⁹ the longest treatment is given to the first, which he explains as meaning that there must be such a unity of doctrine that the idea is not essentially changed, although external variation, and "considerable alteration of proportion and relation, as time goes on, in the parts or aspects of an idea"²⁰ must be expected.

The rest of the notes come in for their due application and involve the author in appropriate historical examples which give rise to many original and often profound observations. An example of this profundity is Newman's remark on the mystical interpretation of Scripture as an instance of a theological principle. "Scrip-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

¹⁹ Cf. A. G. Brickel, S.J. "Newman's Criteria of Historical Evolution," *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, XLIV (1919), 589.

²⁰ *Development*, p. 173.

ture," he says, "may be said to be the medium in which the mind of the Church has energized and developed."²¹

The *Development of Christian Doctrine* is a monument. More than anything else, perhaps, it is the perfect monument to a life of total dedication to the search for truth. Realizing the circumstances in which the book was written, and sympathizing with the life whose own story was on every page of the work, one cannot but be deeply moved by the concluding paragraph:

Such were the thoughts concerning the "Blessed Vision of Peace," of one whose long-continued petition had been that the Most Merciful would not despise the work of His own Hands, nor leave him to himself—while yet his eyes were dim, and his breast laden, and he could but employ Reason in the things of Faith. And now, dear Reader, time is short, eternity is long. Put not from you what you have here found; regard it not as mere matter of present controversy; set not out resolved to refute it, and looking about for the best way of doing so; seduce not yourselves with the imagination that it comes of disappointment, or disgust, or restlessness, or wounded feeling, or undue sensibility, or other weakness. Wrap not yourself round in the associations of years past; nor determine that to be truth which you wish to be so, nor make an idol of cherished anticipations. Time is short, eternity is long.²²

Although the shadows of his Catholic life were to be long and dark and lonely, John Henry Newman had, nevertheless, with the conclusion of his *Development of Christian Doctrine*, taken his first great step "*ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem*."²³

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²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 445.

²³ This is the epitaph Newman chose for his own tomb.

Answers to Questions

ENFORCED THERAPY

Question: What is the morality of forcing a person to undergo therapy? I am concerned particularly with procedures in the army, where sometimes soldiers are obliged to submit to operations, electric shock treatments, psychoanalysis, etc., without having any choice in the matter.

Answer: I do not know whether or not the conditions described by the questioner prevail generally in the army. I hope that at most such instances of enforced therapy are rare cases. At any rate, I shall endeavor to lay down the general principles of morality, according to Catholic belief, relative to the coercion of a person to submit to some medical, surgical or psychiatric remedy.

The most basic principle pertinent to this problem was enunciated by Pope Pius XII, speaking to the participants in the First International Congress on the Histopathology of the Nervous System, in Rome, on September 13, 1952. In the course of his address the Sovereign Pontiff stated: "The doctor can take no measure or try no course of action without the consent of the patient. The doctor has no other rights or power over the patient than those which the latter gives him, explicitly or implicitly and tacitly" (*AAS*, 44 [1952], 782).

From this it follows that the consent of the patient is required before a doctor may subject him to any form of therapy. The basic reason is the dignity of the human person which renders each individual the steward, under God's dominion, of his own body. By virtue of this right (apart from the commission of a crime which might render him liable to a penalty involving loss of bodily integrity or even of life) everyone has the right to determine reasonably whether or not he is to submit to any form of therapy.

However, it is important to note that the Pope stated that the consent of the patient may be given "explicitly or implicitly and tacitly." In other words, there can be occasions when the explicit consent of the sick person may be lacking, and yet it can be reasonably presumed that he is giving implicit or tacit agreement

to some form of therapy. This is surely the case when the patient is too young to make a reasonable decision himself. In that event, the parents have the authority to decide for the child. If there is question of some extraordinary means for preserving the child's life, they should try to make their judgment in accord with what they sincerely believe to be for the best interests of the little one. For example, if a difficult operation is needed to give the child a chance of survival, but it is foreseen that even if it does succeed the child will live only a few years as a helpless idiot, they may reasonably decide not to have the operation. On the other hand, if some ordinary means is needed that will give good hope of restoration of the patient to normal health, the parents are bound to give their consent to the doctor or surgeon in favor of the treatment for the child. For such would be the reasonable will of the child if he were capable of expressing consent. It could happen that the parents through ignorance or erroneous religious concepts (for example, adherents of a sect that is opposed to a normal and necessary operation, such as appendectomy) would refuse consent, and in that event a court order could be justifiable, commanding the treatment on the ground that the parents are unreasonable in their interpretation of the child's will.

In the case of an adult who is unconscious or so mentally deranged that he is unable to make a reasonable decision, the right to decide on the treatment depends on his next of kin, with the same qualifications as described above with reference to a child. And, in either case, when an emergency arises and no relatives are available, a doctor may make the decision himself, forming his judgment on what he believes the patient himself would wish if he were sufficiently mature or in possession of the use of reason. Thus, to consider the particular situation visualized by our questioner, if a soldier were unconscious and in need of an appendectomy to save his life, a surgeon should perform the operation as soon as possible.

What is to be said of the case of a conscious adult who is unreasonably opposed to some form of necessary therapy, such as a blood transfusion to save his life? I believe with Fr. John Ford, S.J. (*Linacre Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 1 [Feb. 1955], pp. 5 ff.), that the doctor should not force treatment on him, since for the patient this has become an extraordinary means of recovery. At

any rate, if he is to be compelled to take treatment, a court order is necessary. I cannot see how it comes within the competence of the military authorities.

Apparently, however, our questioner is not concerned with extraordinary cases. His query centers on the case of a man who is in possession of the use of reason—though perhaps somewhat disturbed emotionally—who is commanded to submit to some form of therapy which may not be at all necessary for the preservation of his life, such as shock-treatment or psychoanalysis. There is no obligation for him to submit to such treatment against his own wishes. To compel him to submit is opposed to the natural-law concept of individual liberty as well as to the traditional American notion of the freedom possessed by every individual citizen. If there is a tendency toward such a policy in the army, it is indeed regrettable, for it is an approach toward the principle of totalitarianism, according to which the individual citizen has no inalienable rights in relation to the authority of the state or the army.

MORAL PROBLEMS OF SPYING

Question: The matter of international spying has been the subject of much discussion recently, and many problems connected with espionage are being discussed. Will you please explain the morality of spying in peacetime and of some of the points connected with it, especially the notion that the spy is expected to commit suicide if he feels that he is likely to divulge some information?

Answer: If the government of a nation is sincerely convinced that a hostile nation (even in peacetime) is making preparation for aggressive measures that will deprive the free nations of their autonomy—and surely such measures are going on in Soviet Russia at present—it is perfectly permissible for that government to send secret agents to the hostile country for the purpose of gathering information that will ward off its attacks if and when they are launched. This is a lawful means of self-protection. In the course of his mission the spy may find it necessary, in order to avoid capture, to use deceptive statements, forged documents, etc. I believe that such measures also can be justified, according to the soundly probable opinion, held by a considerable number of Catholic

authors, that falsehood is permissible, as a measure of self-defense against unjust aggression, when a person is being coerced into giving some information that will aid the questioner toward doing some harm (cf. J. Dorszynski, *The Catholic Doctrine of Falsehood*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1948).

However, I do not see how a spy could be permitted to kill or seriously wound the officials or the citizens of the hostile nation, even when he is captured or in danger of being captured. His government is not at war with the other power, and so he cannot be authorized to kill, as can a soldier. Furthermore, if he is about to be captured, I do not believe that he can use the privilege of one who is the victim of an unjust aggressor and kill those who are seizing him. For the spy knows that he is due to be punished if he is captured, and yet voluntarily puts himself in danger of this fate, so that we can apply the principle: "Scienti et volenti nulla fit injuria." However, I believe that this is a moral problem that admits of further investigation.

A spy may not directly kill himself when he is captured or in danger of being captured, lest he be forced to give important information to the foe. (We say *directly*, because there can be occasions when he could certainly or probably bring about his own death *indirectly*, through the application of the principle of double effect—for example, by blowing up his plane in order to prevent the enemy from seizing important documents, or by trying to escape with the odds against him). Direct suicide would constitute a bad means to a good end, even though he fears that he will be forced to divulge vital information through coercion and torture. The same case would occur if a priest feared that he is to be tortured in order to force him to break the sacramental seal. He should pray for strength to be silent, but he may not commit direct suicide.

Spying may indeed be justified in the present international crisis as a necessary means of preserving our nation. But I believe we would do better if we relied less on such distasteful procedures—which are so strongly emphasized by our atheistic adversaries—and make more use of a form of protection which they would reject, the practical application of our national motto: "In God We Trust."

THREATS AS A MEANS OF NATIONAL PROTECTION

Question: Is it morally permissible to conduct research in order to produce more effective atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons as a means of threatening those nations that are aiming at enslaving the free nations of the earth? In other words, may our government try to equal our foes in the production of such weapons so that they will be aware that if they make use of such means of death and destruction, we are prepared to inflict mass retaliation?

Answer: Pope Pius XII on several occasions, particularly in his radio address to the world on Easter, 1954, deplored the use of atomic, bacteriological and chemical (A.B.C.) weapons of war, and asserted that he would strive vigorously to have them outlawed by international agreement. Nevertheless, the Sovereign Pontiff did not condemn such weapons as intrinsically evil, and even indicated that they could be used in a defensive war thrust unjustly on a nation. For, in speaking of such weapons as undesirable, he used the phrases "saving always the principle of legitimate defense" . . . "unless the war is imposed by an evident and extremely grave injustice, otherwise unavoidable" (*AAS*, 46 [1954], 213, 589). We cannot say, therefore, that the preparation of such weapons is wrong as a measure of just defense, as long as the atheistic powers that are hostile to our land are apparently disposed to use these measures in the event of a war. We should hope that our government, if ever called on to use them, would restrict them to lawful targets and to justifiable limitations. Nevertheless, we are not obliged to give any assurance to our enemies as to the exact way in which they would be used. In other words, there is no moral objection to our producing and retaining atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons as a threat against those governments who would gladly enslave us. Let us hope and pray, however, that the day will come when through effective international agreements such terrible means of death and destruction will be entirely done away with.

FRANCIS J. CONNELL, C.S.S.R.

BLESSINGS IN ENGLISH

Question: At a recent gathering of clergy it was maintained that the English translations contained in the third volume of Father Philip Weller's translation of the Roman Ritual may be used in imparting any of the blessings contained therein, e.g. Blessing and Laying of the Cornerstone of a Church, Blessing of Cakes, the Blessing of Wine on the feast of St. John, Blessing of Homes on the feast of the Epiphany, etc. It was held that the English translation alone may be used to the exclusion of the Latin prayers, i.e. without saying the Latin before or after. Can it be said that this procedure is licit? If illicit, is the sacramental of blessing validly administered? If the sacramental of blessing so administered is invalid, can it be said that the ceremony has the value of a private blessing?

Answer: The *Rituale Romanum*, among the general rules which it sets down for blessings, tells us: "Benedictiones sive constitutivae sive invocativae invalidae sunt, si adhibita non fuerit formula ab Ecclesia praescripta." It is my unpopular opinion that using the formula prescribed by the Church means using the language in which the formula is given us in the authentic liturgical books, unless clear provision is made by the Church for the use of another language, as in such a Rescript as you find in the front of the *Collectio Rituum*. Furthermore, it would seem that the approval of the Sacred Congregation of Rites was given only to the "exemplar a Commissione speciali liturgica exaratum" which was presented with the request of the American hierarchy. It is my belief that the answers to your questions are all negative.

UNICO SIGNO CRUCIS

Question: My former pastor tells me that a simple sign of the cross is sufficient in order to bless almost anything both licitly and validly. He was referring particularly to missals and prayer-books. I have the faculties of a perpetual priest-member of the Society for the Propagation of the Faith, and in my pamphlet of privileges the nearest thing that I can find to all this is "the faculty of blessing with a single Sign of the Cross Coronae, Rosaries, Crosses, Crucifixes, small religious statues and sacred medals, without compensation of any title but with the consent of the

Ordinary at least reasonably presumed, and of attaching to these same articles the Apostolic Indulgences listed on pages 4, 5, and 6" (p. 3). Is it sinful to bless prayerbooks without surplice or stole or holy water, with the simple, silent sign of the cross? Or does this procedure merely impede the indulgences, yet confer some blessing? What about the blessing of pictures according to this procedure? The Synod of the Doicese says nothing about allowing such a procedure.

Answer: Gerard Montague, D.D., in *Problems in the Liturgy* (Westminster: Newman Press, 1958, pp. 413-414), in answer to a very similar question, writes: "A writer in the *Ephemerides Liturgicae* for 1933 holds that when faculties are granted to bless objects of piety *unico signo crucis*, it is probably necessary for validity that the words *In nomine Patris*, etc., be pronounced. When the validity of indulgences is at stake, this opinion *protutius* should be followed although, until an authentic declaration is promulgated by the Holy See, the obligation to pronounce any words remains doubtful. When there is a question of a simple blessing and indulgences are not at stake, there is no obligation to follow the stricter view. The principal arguments by which it is sought to establish the obligation to say the words are: (a) a Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites published in 1854; (b) the rubrics of the *Ritus servandus in celebratione Missae*; (c) a reply of Code Commission in 1929; and (d) the formula used in certain quinquennial faculties granted to bishops. Against these contentions it is urged that the Sacred Congregation of Indulgences in more than one decree decided that the words are not necessary, and there is excellent extrinsic authority for this view. To cite a few of these authorities: Vermeersch-Creusen makes the following comment in canon 349 (*Epitome Iuris Canonici*, i, p. 348): '... ubi nulla vero, vel communis tantum formula proponitur unico signo crucis, i.e. ne verbis quidem *In nomine Patris*, etc., adhibitis, in sacris benedictionibus contenti esse possunt.' And in the same context Cappello notes (*Summa Iuris Canonici*, i, p. 345): 'Verba ritibus ab Ecclesia praescriptis non ita sunt intelligenda ut Episcopi prohibeantur in sacris benedictionibus uti solo crucis signo, quoties peculiaris forma in libris liturgicis non sit praescripta.' Heylen (*Tractatus de Indulgentiis* [1948], p. 152) states: 'Ad praefatas indulgentias (i.e. indulgentias apostolicas) objectis piis applicandas

sufficit signum crucis, etiamsi indulto addatur clausula: *in forma Ecclesiae consueta* idque generatim ut sufficiens est habendum quoties forma specialis non est praescripta.' In 1914 the Holy Office, in dealing with the question whether it is necessary to repeat several times the sign of the cross when one blesses several different objects, replied (*A.A.S.*, 1914, p. 346): 'In benedicendis pluribus similibus aut diversis religionis obiectis, quae sacerdoti pluribus facultatibus munito coniuncta vel commixta offeruntur, atque in ipsis, vigore diversarum facultatum, indulgentiis ditandis, sufficere unicum signum pro pluribus benedictionibus atque indulgentiarum adnexionibus.' Commenting on this decree, De Angelis writes (*De Indulgentiis* [1946], p. 139): 'Necesse tamen est ut sacerdos, hoc crucis signum super res benedicendas efformans, intentionem habeat circa indulgentias quas ipse vult adnectere.' Hence we may conclude that, in the light of existing decrees and opinions, it is by no means certain that, when faculties are granted to bless objects *unico signo crucis*, the words *In nomine Patris*, etc., must be pronounced."

You will notice that a couple of these opinions introduce the qualification "as long as no special form is prescribed." If, for example, you are asked to bless a Miraculous Medal, you must have the requisite faculty and you must follow the special formula of blessing prescribed by the Sacred Congregation of Rites in 1895; otherwise, the blessing is null; a medal so blessed would not carry the distinctive indulgences of the Miraculous Medal. The medal must also be formally imposed; the blessing and imposition cannot be separated.

To conclude, there are many objects of piety which may be blessed with a simple, silent sign of the cross by a priest who has the required faculties. A Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Indulgences (*Rescripta Authentica*, p. 313) reads: "Quando in indulto existit clausula: '*In Forma Ecclesiae Consueta*' sufficit signum crucis efformare super res benedicendas, et sine aspersione aquae benedictae." However, when a specific formula, with a view to gaining a specific indulgence, is prescribed, the formula must be used for validity.

JOHN P. McCORMICK, S.S.

Book Reviews

PSYCHIATRY AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE. By Louis Linn, M.D., and Leo W. Schwartz. New York: Random House, 1958. Pp. 297. \$4.95.

PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY AND NEUROSIS. By A. A. A. Terruwe, M.D. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1958. Pp. 172. \$3.50.

It must be rather unusual for a Catholic priest to recommend to other priests a book on "Psychiatry and Religious Experience," written by a Jewish psychiatrist and a Jewish chaplain. But that is just what I am doing.

The title of the book is not quite accurate. It is really about how a clergyman can co-operate with a psychiatrist; or, to quote one sentence from the preface: "It is the aim of this book to show how the insights of psychiatry and religion may be used for the relief of human suffering and the release of creative human energies."

The theme of these authors is that a clergyman can and should co-operate with the psychiatrist, not by the clergyman's stepping out of his role as a religious leader but by adhering to it. The book is full of case histories which not only make it interesting but give instances in which the psychiatrist and the clergyman have co-operated to the benefit of the patient.

The time has passed when psychiatry and religion were looked on as enemies. They are—or should be—allies. A mentally or emotionally sick person is impeded in the practice of his religion. Restoration to mental and emotional health is an aid to religion. Co-operation does not mean that the clergyman must become an assistant to the psychiatrist—or vice versa. Religion has certain therapeutic values, but it cannot be reduced to a kind of therapy. It can never become a means to an end. A clergyman can help a psychiatrist by pointing out the person's religious resources, and the psychiatrist can help a clergyman by removing the mental or emotional disorder which interferes with the practice of the person's religion.

No reputable psychiatrist these days tries to destroy or change a person's religion. He realizes that religion, sincerely practiced, can be a source of strength for the person he is treating.

A hearty recommendation of this book does not mean agreement with everything in it. In the first place, its strictly Freudian point of view would be unacceptable to most priests. All of its chapters are interesting, but not all are of equal value. For instance, the one on "Facing Bereavement" is very weak. The one on "Religion Conversion and Mysticism" is almost completely unacceptable to Catholics. The authors seem to think that both of these experiences are usually the result of a mental or emotional disorder. But the chapter that follows—"Religion and the Aging"—is one of the best in the book. However, even here a more accurate title would be "Religious Social Service and the Aging."

The authors usually avoid the term "clergyman" and speak of the "religious leader." The reason probably is that "clergyman" most often means a minister, less frequently a priest, and very seldom a rabbi. Dr. Linn and Chaplain Schwartz have tried to make their book apply equally to the work of Protestants, Catholics and Jews. They have succeeded admirably in being fair to all three major "faith groups."

As far as Catholics are concerned, there are a couple of errors of fact. The authors state that the Catholic Church teaches that masturbation is a venial sin, and that St. Margaret Mary is the foundress of the "Order of the Sacred Heart." But they are so obviously incorrect that no Catholic would be disturbed by them.

Psychiatry and Religious Experience has to be read with discrimination. But any priest, by virtue of his seminary training, can easily distinguish between what is in accordance with the Catholic religion, and what is not.

Despite the fact that he cannot agree with everything in this book, any priest can read it with great profit to himself, and to the mentally and emotionally disturbed people with whom he comes in contact.

* * * * *

If one wants a technical book on psychopathic personality and the neuroses from the psychiatric point of view, Dr. Terruwe's book is not for him. But if one wants a book that will help in counseling some of the people encountered in day-to-day pastoral work, this is just the book.

Dr. Terruwe is a woman psychiatrist who practices at Nijmegen, Holland. She is a practicing Catholic, as well as a practicing psychiatrist. And she knows Scholastic philosophy. This makes the book especially helpful to priests. She doesn't try to prove that St. Thomas knew contemporary psychiatry, but she shows that some of the fundamental principles about human behavior and human nature concerning which the Angelic Doctor wrote, are also fundamental principles used by

many contemporary psychiatrists, non-Catholic as well as Catholic. This is important for priests because these are matters with which they are already acquainted.

As has been stated already, the book is not technical. Any priest can easily understand it. He will readily recognize the types of mental disorders with which she deals. Dr. Terruwe does not tell priests how to become psychotherapists. In fact, she warns them against getting "out of their field." But she does give some very fine suggestions as to how they, as priests, can help their parishioners with their problems.

Some of the passages in the book are outstanding—e.g., the section entitled "The Attitude of the Clergyman toward Psychopathic Women." This part could be read with profit by all priests, especially young ones. Dr. Terruwe can help priests to form an enlightened attitude toward Freud. She does not think that everything he wrote is contrary to the Catholic religion. In fact, she finds much that is helpful. On the other hand, she doesn't hesitate to say that in her opinion some Catholics have gone too far in accepting some of his teachings—and she tells why.

Dr. Terruwe wrote in Dutch, but the translation is so good that one would think the book had been written in English. The chief fault of the book is its lack of an index. A number of case histories make it interesting and "to the point."

This book is to be highly recommended to parish priests.

WILBUR F. WHEELER

MEDIATRESS OF ALL GRACES. By Michael O'Carroll, C.S.SP. Dublin, Eire: Golden Eagle Books, Ltd., 1958. Pp. 308.

It has been calculated that there have appeared throughout the years over twenty thousand books on Napoleon. Of necessity, these books repeat certain facts, and it would be a naïve individual indeed who should expect new and startling information about dates of birth, battles, or death of the exile of Elba. In like manner it may be well calculated that much more than a paltry twenty thousand books have been written on the subject of Our Lady. Nevertheless this book must be welcomed in the field of Mariology not because it presents novelties about Our Lady but because it presents in a novel and complete manner those enduring doctrines of the Mother of God.

Among his introductory remarks the author clearly states the sources of knowledge about Our Lady, namely, the Sacred Scriptures and Tradition as interpreted by the teaching authority of the Church. The author refers also to the accepted principles of interpretation in arriving at conclusions of which the Church has not formally and explicitly

spoken. These principles, briefly summarized, are these: (1) All things being weighed most carefully, those perfections are to be attributed to the Blessed Virgin which are seen to agree with her dignity as Mother of God and as Mediatrix; (2) To the Blessed Virgin Mary as the Mother of God and an associate of the Redeemer we must attribute formally or in an eminent measure, and indeed in a superior degree, all the privileges which have been granted to the different saints; (3) Allowing for the immense difference between them, there is a certain parallel or analogy between the privileges of Christ's humanity and those enjoyed by His Blessed Mother. In drawing conclusions from these principles, care must be used to keep in mind the witness of Scripture and Tradition, the teaching authority of the Church and the sense of the faithful.

Throughout this work the author gives evidence of his adherence to these principles. While there will be those who will not agree with all his conclusions about the Blessed Virgin, no one can question his sincerity of purpose or scholarly approach to difficult questions. It is difficult to think of some aspect or title of Our Lady which is not included in this book. Beginning with a brief history of the rise of the position of women over the ages, the author traces a possible parallel between the dignity of women in various centuries and the accompanying increase in devotion to the Blessed Mother. It is a persuasive parallel and deserving of credence. From this historical inception the author goes on to examine the personality, the maternity, the faith, hope, and love of Our Lady. Each chapter is replete with scriptural quotations and the dicta of the Fathers as documentary evidence of the conclusions drawn.

One of the most interesting sections of the book, and one which constitutes about half of the work, is that concerned with Mary as Co-redemptress, advocate and dispenser of graces, and Mother of the Mystical Body. This section is particularly valuable for its many quotations from the writings of the Popes on the subject throughout the years. With persuasion and logic the author presents the interpretation of Mary's role in the redemption and subsequent salvation of mankind. It is here that the author's real purpose is manifest and after perusal of this treatment the reader is inclined to join in the expressed hope of a definition of the doctrine regarding Mary's role in the redemption.

This book is written for the educated layman. The style is simple and easy to read and understand. For the layman the concluding chapter may be the most interesting for it contains a summary of the various apparitions of the Blessed Mother throughout the world and a particular warning of over-credulous attitudes and their contrary, skeptical

opinions, in regard to visions. Withal it may be said that this work may take its place proudly with others written about the most noble and lovable woman of all—the Mother of God.

JOHN F. NEVINS

EUCCHARISTIC REFLECTIONS. By Msgr. William Reyna. Adapted by Winfrid Herbst, S.D.S. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1957. Pp. xii + 404. \$4.75.

Prolific Father Herbst originally published in eight small volumes his translation from the German edition (by Otilie Boediker) of Msgr. Reyna's Italian work. Now Father Herbst presents an edited and more concise one-volume edition of the entire book.

The present volume is a "pious" one. In style it is characterized by the sentimentality usual in the spiritual reading books of eighty years ago; the major difference is that Father Herbst has translated Msgr. Reyna's book into readable modern American and not, as some spiritual writers do, into a brand of English which was *passé* by the time of the American Revolution.

Sentences like: "O Paradise, swing open wide your golden Gate! Angels of God, come down, form a wreath round my heart, wherein Jesus has taken up His abode . . ." (p. 140) lead a reviewer at first to suggest that the book will not suit those Religious who are at home with the deeper theological treatises. But a collection of meditations on the Blessed Sacrament, such as the present one, because of the very nature of the subject, could be of immense subjective help even to learned theologians. For the book, completely affective, can readily serve as adequate impetus to get a busy priest or religious started in making acts of love to God both during meditation time and throughout the day. A skim through the book will best indicate to the reader if it can help him in this regard. The reviewer's opinion is that the book's value lies substantially on its subjective value to the reader and not on the objective merit of the matter as it is presented.

If the book had been organized differently, one could recommend it for the Catholic laity, too. But in format *Eucharistic Reflections* is apparently directed to Religious, and is perhaps too technically organized toward the religious life for a layman to feel completely at home with it.

DONALD F. X. CONNOLLY, C.S.P.

Books Received

ST. TERESA OF AVILA. By Giorgio Papasogli. Translated by G. Anzitutto. New York: Society of St. Paul, 1960. Pp. 408. \$4.00.

SPEECH TRAINING IN THE MINOR SEMINARY. Edited by Cornelius M. Cuyler, S.S. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1960. Pp. vi + 67. \$1.00.

UNDERSTANDING COMMUNISM. By Stanley Vischer. New York: St. Paul Publications, 1960. Pp. 48. 35¢.

THE LONG ADVENTURE By Franz Weyergans. Translated by Joseph Cunneen. Chicago: Regnery, 1960. Pp. 134. \$3.50.

REVOLT FOR DEMOCRACY. By Albert Nulli. New York: Greenwich Book Publishers, 1960. Pp. 47. \$1.95.

NEW PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL ETHICS. Edited by Dom Peter Flood. Translated by Malachy Gerald Carroll. Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1960. Pp. iv + 225. \$4.50.

THAT THEY MAY SHARE: A MASS COMMENTARY. By Alfred C. Longley and Frederick R. McManus. New York: Benziger, 1960. Pp. xviii + 269. \$9.50.

LIVE YOUR VOCATION. By Paulo Provera, C.M. Translated by Thomas F. Murray. St. Louis: Herder, 1960. Pp. 260. \$3.75.

PIONEER THEORIES OF MISSIOLOGY. By Ronan Hoffman, O.F.M. Conv. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1960. Pp. xiv + 182. \$3.25.

THE HOLY SPIRIT AND THE ART OF LIVING. By J. A. O'Driscoll, S.M. St. Louis: Herder, 1960. Pp. 127. \$2.35.

THE SACRED PASSION. By Luis de Granada, O.P. Translated by Edward J. Schuster. St. Louis: Herder, 1960. Pp. 116, \$1.50.

WITNESSES OF THE GOSPEL. By Henry Panneel. Translated by Paul A. Barrett, O. P. St. Louis: Herder, 1960. Pp. ix + 192. \$3.75.

MISSIONARY SPIRITUALITY. By Bernard J. Kelly, C.S.Sp. Dublin: Gill and Son, 1960. Pp. x + 165. 15/.

CATECHISM OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING. By Amintore Fanfani. Translated by Henry J. Yannone. Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1960. Pp. xxvii + 208.

THE SECRET BOOKS OF THE EGYPTIAN GNOSTICS. By Jean Doresse. New York: Viking Press, 1960. Pp. xvii + 445. \$6.50.

THE THIRD MYSTIC OF AVILA: MARIA VELA. Foreword and translation by Frances Parkinson Keyes. New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1960. Pp. 300. \$4.75.

OPERE ASCETISCHE. By St. Alphonsus de Ligouri. Introduzione Generale. A cura di O. Gregorio, G. Cacciatore, D. Capone. Rome: Edizioni di storia e letterature, 1960. Pp. xvii + 409. No price given.

HOW THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IS GOVERNED. By Heinrich Scharp. New York: Herder & Herder, 1960. Pp. 168. \$2.95.

THE BOOK OF LEVITICUS. With a commentary by Carroll Stuhlmueller, C. P. New York: Paulist Press, 1960. Pp. 96. 75¢.

SAINTS IN THE VALLEY: CHRISTIAN SACRED IMAGES IN THE HISTORY, LIFE AND FOLK ART OF SPANISH NEW MEXICO. By José E. Espinosa. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1960. Pp. xiii + 122. \$6.50.

LA LOGICA SINTETICA E LA STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA. By Roberto Pavese. Padova: CEDAM, 1960. Pp. 240. No price given.

